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ARTICLES
Into the Star Chamber:
Does the United States Engage in the Use of
Torture or Similar Illegal Practices in the
War on Terror?
BY JEFFREY F. ADDICOTT*
I. INTRODUCTION
"In any civilized society the most important task is achieving a proper
balance between freedom and order. In wartime, reason and history both
suggest that this balance shifts to some degree in favor of order--in favor
of the government's ability to deal with conditions that threaten the
national well-being. "'
William H. Rehnquist
As America makes its way through the third year of the "War
on Terror,"2 a deep fissure runs through the legal commun-
Assistant Professor of Law and Director, Center for Terrorism Law, St.
Mary's University School of Law. B.A. 1976 (with honors), University of
Maryland; J.D. 1979, University of Alabama; LL.M. 1987, The Judge Advocate
General's School of Law; LL.M. 1992, S.J.D.1994, University of Virginia. This
Article was prepared under the auspices of the Center for Terrorism Law located
at St. Mary's University School of Law, San Antonio, Texas. The goal of the
Center is to examine both current and potential legal issues attendant to terrorism.
The author wishes to acknowledge with special thanks the efforts of research
assistants Timothy Ward and Nicole Lewis who supported this Article with
outstanding research.
WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE 222 (1998).
2 See generally JEFFREY F. ADDICOTT, WINNING THE WAR ON TERROR: LEGAL
AND POLICY LESSONS FROM THE PAST 20-32 (2003) (describing "War on Terror"
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ity.3 On one side are those who steadfastly maintain that existing laws and
processes need no or very minor changes, while others advocate the
implementation of significant changes to alter our current legal system's
focus from punishing completed crimes to a more aggressive approach
capable of preventing terrorist attacks.4 Understandably, the pivot in every
discussion regards the balance struck between protecting civil liberties5 and
providing adequate safety to the nation from the threat of terrorism.
Considering that a nuclear truck bomb could obliterate an entire
American city and cause a "panicky stampede into truly oppressive police
statism in which measures now unthinkable could suddenly become
unstoppable," a 2003 Brookings Institute report aptly argued that
"[s]tubborn adherence to the civil liberties status quo would probably
damage our most fundamental freedoms far more in the long run than
would judicious modifications of rules that are less fundamental."6 A
weapon of mass destruction ("WMD") event in the future could open a
Pandora's box filled with draconian security measures.7
as more than a mere metaphor, particularly in light of various acts and pronounce-
ments of the executive and legislative bodies of government concerning the use of
force as well as the nature and structure of the al-Qfeda virtual State); see also,
e.g., Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862) (rejecting a challenge to President
Lincoln's authority to blockade secessionist Southern States without a Congressio-
nal declaration of war); Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq
Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498 (2002) [hereinafter Joint
Resolution Against Iraq]; Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No.
107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (authorizing the use of force against the Taliban
regime) [hereinafter Joint Resolution Against Afghanistan].
3 The United States Supreme Court has agreed to hear a number of pivotal cases
in the 2004 term to include the legality of whether an American citizen can be
labeled an "enemy combatant" and detained in the United States without trial or
access to an attorney. See Mark Helm, Justices to Review "Enemy" Case, SAN
ANTONIO EXPRESS NEWS, Jan. 10, 2004, at A3. But see Richard Benedetto, Most
Say War Worth Fighting; Bush Approval at 59%; Polls Show Division Over
Whether Troops Should Start Coming Home, USA TODAY, Aug. 28, 2003, at A8
(highlighting the fact that the polls repeatedly show that the majority of Americans
approve of the Bush administration's handling of the War on Terror).
'See Stuart Taylor, Jr., Rights, Liberties, and Security, 21 BROOKINGS REV. 25
(2003) (advocating steps such as preventive detention).
' Black's defines civil liberty as "[flreedom from undue governmental
interference or restraint." See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 239 (7th ed. 1999).
6 Taylor, supra note 4, at 26.
' See id.
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Because of the murderous machinations of al-QAeda styled terrorism,'
the government has crafted a variety of robust antiterrorism9 responses
designed to disrupt the terrorist network and prevent future terrorist attacks
from occurring. These measures include passage of the USA Patriot Act;'0
creation of the Cabinet level post of Secretary of Homeland Security and
the Department of Homeland Security;" and establishment of United
States Northern Command in Colorado. 2 The United States has also
engaged in more controversial actions, such as the use of preemptive
military force against rogue states 3 and the indefinite detention of
' The al-Qdeda terror organization was founded in 1989 by a Saudi named
Osama bin Laden. Dedicated to the destruction of the West, the organization has
demonstrated over the past three years that it is truly international in scope with the
resources and personnel to coordinate sophisticated terror attacks on a scale never
before seen. It is linked to a variety of terrorist groups from the Philippines to
Indonesia and has trained thousands of Arab and non-Arab militants in Afghanistan
under the Taliban regime. Fueled by a super-fundamentalist Islamic radicalism, its
foot soldiers of hate gladly embrace death in their continuing quest for mass
murder. See Michael Elliott, Why the War on Terror Will Never End, TIME, May
26, 2003, at 29.
9 See ADDIcoT'r, supra note 2, at 18, 60. Antiterrorism involves all those
proactive steps taken to decrease the probability of a terrorist incident. Counter-
terrorism, contrastingly, involves all those tactical actions taken in response to a
terrorist attack. Id. at 18.
0 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Re-
quired to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L.
No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272. The bill passed the Senate by a landslide vote of 98-1.
147 CONG. REC. S 10,990 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001). The House of Representatives
passed their version by a similar vote of 357-66. 147 CONG. REC. H7224 (daily ed.
Oct. 25, 2001).
" See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135
[hereinafter Homeland Security Act]; see generally Editorial, Seeking Homeland
Security, N.Y. POST, June 7, 2002, at 32 ("[T]he new department would incorpo-
rate more than 100 different government divisions from eight separate Cabinet
departments into a single agency whose sole mission is homeland security.").
12 The U.S. Northern Command is located at Peterson Air Force Base in
Colorado Springs, Colorado. It was established October 1, 2002, and is the single
military headquarters focused on national defense and national assistance following
a major natural disaster or man-made attack. There are currently about 500 military
and civilian personnel assigned to the new command. See Vince Crawley, 9-11
Means 24/7: Northern Command Scrutinizes All Threats-Man-Made or Natural,
ARMY TIMES, Jan. 19, 2004, at 18.
"3 See Joint Resolution Against Iraq, supra note 2 (linking the use of force
against Iraq to Iraq's support of terrorism).
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suspected illegal alien terrorists 4 and enemy combatants. 5 Some have
challenged the government's shift in tactical focus from punitive measures
against terrorist criminals who engage in aggression to broad preventative
methods as being illegal or inconsistent with American values. 6 One issue
eliciting tremendous debate in the arena of prevention measures, particu-
larly in light of the Abu Ghraib prison abuse scandal, 7 is whether the
United States can and does employ torture or ill-treatment 8 to interrogate
'4 See infra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
'5 See infra notes 99, 104-09 and accompanying text.
16 Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp.
No. 31, at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974). The U.N. Definition of Aggression
states in main part:
Article 1
Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty,
territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any
manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations ....
Article 2
The first use of armed force by a State in contravention of the Charter shall
constitute prima facie evidence of an act of aggression ....
Article 3
Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, subject
to... article 2, qualify as an act of aggression:
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of
another State... ;
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of
another State... ;
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of
another State... ;
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea, or air forces,
or marine and air fleets of another State ... ;
(e) The use of armed forces of one State . . . in contravention of the
conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of their
presence in such territory beyond the termination of the agreement;
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the
disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating
an act of aggression against a third State... ;
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups,
irregulars or mercenaries which carry out acts of armed force against
another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its
substantial involvement therein ....
See Johanna McGeary, The Scandal's Growing Stain, TIME, May 17, 2004,
at 26.
"S See infra Part III.
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suspected terrorists or enemy combatants. Concern primarily focuses upon
the alleged American practice known as "stress and duress" interroga-
tion--the use of various forms and levels of physical and physiological
force to extract information. Accompanying this concern is the issue of
rendition, in which the United States allegedly sends detainees to third
nations where they are subjected to interrogations employing torture or
other illegal techniques. 9
Some individuals and interest groups charge that American interroga-
tion practices and treatment of terrorist and enemy combatant detainees
involve torture.2" Not every alleged incident of mistreatment necessarily
satisfies the legal definition of torture. Therefore, one must view such
allegations with a clear understanding of the applicable legal standards set
out in law and judicial precedent. In this manner, claims of illegal
interrogation practices are properly measured as falling above or below a
particular legal threshold. Only then can one hope to set aside the rhetoric
and objectively establish whether the United States stands in violation of
the rule of law.2'
Another parallel issue in America's war against terrorism is how
authorities should deal with the so-called "ticking-time-bomb"22 terrorist.
The concern is so great that many prominent voices both within and outside
of the government advocate a judicial exception allowing torture as an
interrogation tool in special instances.23 Perhaps one of the most unex-
'9 See Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends
Interrogations; 'Stress and Duress' Tactics Used on Terrorism Suspects Held in
Secret Overseas Facilities, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2002, at Al.
20 See, e.g., Alan Cooperman, CIA Interrogation Under Fire; Human Rights
Group Say Techniques Could Be Torture, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 2002, at A9
(noting that Human Rights Watch accused the United States of violating
international law by torturing detainees and turning detainees over to States that
engaged in torture).
21 Rule of law is defined in Black's as "a substantive legal principle" and "[t]he
doctrine that every person is subject to the ordinary law within the jurisdiction."
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at 1332.
22 See infra Part IV.
23 See Priest & Gellman, supra note 19, at Al ("[C]urrent national security
officials.., defended the use of violence against captives as just and necessary.");
Brief for Petitioner, Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003) (No. 01-1444)
[hereinafter Chavez Brief for Petitioner] (arguing that the Court should carve out
a "terrorist exception" regarding the constitutional parameters surrounding an
interrogation); Dermot Purgavie, As US. Decides How to Force an Al Qaeda
Leader to Tell His Secrets; Can We Use Torture to Combat Terror?, DAILY
EXPRESS (London), May 20, 2002, at 12 (describing the academic and legal debate
2003-2004]
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pected voices to advocate such a position is well-known civil libertarian
Professor Alan Dershowitz.24
Some might claim that Dershowitz is simply reflecting a new and ugly
pragmatism associated with blunting the terrorists. Nevertheless, America
cannot allow itself to slip into a Star Chamber 5 mentality where the State
recognizes torture as a necessary evil. In order to find the appropriate
balance between civil liberties and security concerns, the purpose of this
Article is twofold. First, this Article measures interrogation practices used
by the United States to get information from various categories of detainees
in light of both the domestic and international laws on torture and other
forms of mistreatment. In other words, is the United States using illegal
interrogation methods in the War on Terror, as has been charged? Second,
in the special case of the "ticking-time-bomb" terrorist, should the United
States openly disregard the rule of law and officially sanction the use of
torture?
II. DEFINING TORTURE
"The screw may twist and the rack may turn,
And men may bleed and men may burn .... 26
W.S. Gilbert
Torture as a State instrument to either punish or extract information
from certain individuals has a long and dark history which need not be
recounted here.27 In the West, one usually traces the practice to the
over torture); Peter Slevin, US. Pledges Not to Torture Terror Suspects, WASH.
POST, June 27, 2003, at Al.24 See ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS: UNDERSTANDING THE
THREAT, RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE 141 (2002) [hereinafter DERSHOWITZ,
WHY TERRORISM WORKS]. Dershowitz argues that allowing torture after "advance
judicial approval" would reduce the amount of torture, make it publicly account-
able, and "maximize civil liberties." Id.
25 See DAVID HARRIS WILLSON, A HISTORY OF ENGLAND 227-29 (1967). The
Star Chamber was developed under Henry VII (1485-1509). It consisted of some
twenty to thirty councilors to the King who were given extraordinary power to
judge certain cases without the use ofjury. "It put men under oath and forced them
to answer questions that might incriminate them." Id. at 228.
26 WILLIAM S. GILBERT & ARTHUR SULLIVAN, YEOMEN OF THE GUARD: OR THE
MERRYMAN AND HIS MAID (G. Schirmer ed., 1986) (1888).
27 See generally JAMES HEATH, TORTURE AND ENGLISH LAW (1982); JOHN H.
LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF: EUROPE AND ENGLAND IN THE
ANCIEN REGIME (1977) (discussing the State-sanctioned use of torture in ancient
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Romans who codified the use of torture as part of the Roman criminal
law.28
In England the earliest authoritative records regarding the State use of
torture appear in the Privy Council registers in the year 1540 and extends,
with some gaps in the reports, for a hundred years.29 The Crown issued less
than one hundred official warrants, an amazingly low figure relative to the
number of felony investigations in any given year. 0 This low statistic
demonstrates that torture was predominantly used for interrogation and not
for punishment.3' The 1597 case of Jesuit priest John Gerard typifies the
goal of torture. The Crown's warrant in Gerard's case directed that he be
tortured in the Tower of London by means of "the manacles '3 2 and other
"such torture" as necessary to make Gerard "utter directly and truly his
uttermost knowledge"33 concerning certain traitors to the Crown.
Europe and England).
28 See EDWARD PETERS, TORTURE 28 (1966) (describing the Roman uses of
torture in the investigative process).
29 See LANGBEIN, supra note 27, at 93-99.
30 HEATH, supra note 27, at 82.
3" Id. at 74-79, 93-98, 109-21 (noting that only about a quarter of the torture
warrants dealt with common felony crime where the goal of torture was primarily
evidentiary).
32 Id. at 183-84. This refers to the practice of hanging a person by his wrists
suspended off the ground. The "rack," however, was the most preferred form of
torture. It involved stretching the subject on a wooden platform.
" Id. at 226. The complete warrant issued by the Crown reads as follows:
A letter to Sir Richard Barkly, Lieutenant of the Tower. Mr. Sollicitor, Mr.
Bacon and William Waad, esquire. You shall understand that one Gerratt
[Gerard], a Jesuite, by her Majesty's commandment is of late committed to
the Tower of London for that yt hath been discovered to her Majestie [that]
he verie latelie did receive a packet of letters out of the Lowe Countr which
are supposed to come out of Spayne, [he] being noted to be a great
intelligencer and to holde correspondence with Parsons the Jesuite and
other traitors beyond the seas. These shalbe therefore to require you to
examyne him strictlie upon such interrogatories as shalbe fitt to be
[ad]ministered unto him and he ought to answer to manyfest the truthe in
that behalf and other things that may concern her Majesty and the State,
wherein yf you shall find him obstinate, undutyfull, or unwilling to declare
and reveale the truthe as he ought to do by his duty and allegeannce, you
shall by virtue hereof cause him to be put to the manacles and suche other
torture as is used in that place, that he may be forced to utter directlie and
truly his uttermost knowledg in all these things that maie any waie conceme
her Majesty and the State and are meet to be knowne.
2003-2004]
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Today, torture is universally prohibited,34 both by fixed law and
customary practice.35 Many States have ratified the various international
agreements associated with banning torture.36 Nevertheless, even though no
State allows torture in its domestic law,37 the practice continues to flourish.
Governments in approximately more than sixty countries and territories
torture various prisoners and detainees.38 Add to this paradox the dilemma
that some of the acts that should clearly constitute torture do not enjoy a
uniformity of definition within the international community. As one legal
commentator rightly pointed out: "The prohibition of torture ... is not,
itself, controversial. The prohibition in application, however, yields endless
contention as each perpetrator seeks to define its own behavior so as not to
violate the ban. 39
A. International Agreements
Prior to exploring the international legal definition of torture, it is
useful to survey the general understanding of the term. Torture comes from
the Latin verb "torquere" (to twist) and is defined in leading dictionaries as
follows: "Infliction of severe physical pain as a means of punishment or
coercion;"4 "The act of inflicting excruciating pain, as punishment or
revenge, as a means of getting a confession or information, or for sheer
" See Winston P. Nagen & Lucie Atkins, The International Law of Torture:
From Universal Proscription to Effective Application and Enforcement, 14 HARV.
HUM. RTS. J. 87 (2001). But see Jon B. Jordan, Universal Jurisdiction in a
Dangerous World: A WeaponforAllNations Against International Crime, 9 MICH.
ST. U.-DCL J. INT'L L. 1,28 (2000) (arguing that torture has not become a matter
of customary international law because it is not uniformly defined).
" Customary international law consists of all those binding norms practiced by
nations. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102 (1987).
36 See OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, STATUS OF
RATIFICATIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES
(2003), at http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf As of November 2, 2003, fifty-
seven States had ratified the Torture Convention, and an additional sixty-one had
signed it. Id.
31 See NIGEL S. RODLEY, THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS UNDER INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 74 (2d ed. 1999) (finding that no State allows torture under its
domestic law).
38 Catherine M. Grosso, International Law in the Domestic Arena: The Case
of Torture in Israel, 86 IOWA L. REV. 305, 308 (2000).39 id.
40 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1452 (4th ed. 2002).
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cruelty;"'" "The infliction of intense pain to the body or mind to punish, to
extract a confession or information, or to obtain sadistic pleasure. 42
The essential elements in these definitions are (1) the infliction of
severe pain to the body or mind (2) used to punish or obtain information.
International law adopts and sharpens this basic formula. International law
stipulates that only State actors may be guilty of torture.43 Under this
definition, certain criminals may torture their victims when committing a
particularly gruesome murder,44 but these non-State actors carrying the
same crime may not violate the international law on torture. Additionally,
international law expands the prohibition of torture to include other less
abusive acts commonly called "other acts of cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment," or simply "ill-treatment."45
Like the concept of human rights, international law said little about the
practice of State torture until the close of World War 11.46 After the United
Nations was established in 1945, nations came together and crafted a series
of international declarations and agreements based on the human rights
ideals embodied in the United Nations Charter.47 The prohibition of torture
and ill-treatment are core rights found in the most important of these
documents.
41 RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1999 (2d ed.
1987).
42 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at 1498.
41 See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Reg. 39146, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No.
51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51/Annex (1984) [hereinafter Torture Convention]
(indicating torture must be "inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent
or acquiescence of a public official").
4 See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 484 S.E.2d. 543 (N.C. 1997). The defendant was
convicted of first degree murder by torture for beating victim, using soldering iron
on victim's arm, using aerosol torch on victim's genital area, carving derogatory
term into victim's arm, and binding and gagging victim in trailer home's closet
where victim expired. Id.
"5 See Torture Convention, supra note 43, at 198 (article 16(1)); see also infra
notes 61--64 and accompanying text.
46 See Matthew Lippman, The Development and Drafting ofthe United Nations
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, 17 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 275, 289-90 (1994) (arguing that
it was the Nazi atrocities that prompted the world to protect human rights).
41 See U.N. CHARTER, art. 1, § 3. One of the primary purposes of the United
Nations is "promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for
fundamental freedoms for all." Id.
2003-2004]
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Article 5 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights serves as
the foundation for all subsequent international agreements on torture.48
Article 5 of the Declaration says in one brief sentence that "[no] one shall
be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment."49 After adopting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
the U.N. passed the widely influential and legally binding International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.50 In pertinent part, Article 7 of the
Covenant utilizes the exact same language found in the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights.5 Before ratifying the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, the United States Senate sought to clarify the
meaning of Article 7. The Senate achieved this through a reservation which
defined "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" as "the
cruel and unusual treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth,
and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.
z5 2
In 1975, the United Nations adopted the Declaration on the Protection
of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment." This document, though only a
declaration, served as the basis for the 1984 United Nations Convention
against Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment ("Torture Convention"), which was the primary international
agreement governing torture and ill-treatment.54 The Torture Convention
more fully addressed a previous source of controversy-the distinction
48 Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
4 9 
id.
" International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A,
(XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was opened for signature,
ratification, and accession on Dec. 16, 1966 and entered into force on Mar. 23,
1976, in accordance with art. 49. Id.
"' Id. at 53. The second part of Article 7 states: "In particular, no one shall be
subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation." Id.;
see also Lippman, supra note 46, at 288 (noting that this section was added in
response to "[t]he Nazis engag[ing] in a series of unprecedented, gruesome medical
experiments on concentration camp inmates").
52 136 CONG. REC. 517, 486 (1990).
" Declaration on the Protection ofAll Persons from Being Subjected to Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res.
3452, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, at 91, U.N. Doc. AIRES/3452(XXX)
(1975).
54 Torture Convention, supra note 43, at 197.
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between "torture" and "other acts of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
or punishment."" While previous documents prohibited both types of
treatment, the Torture Convention defined the obligations and conse-
quences attendant to each type of act for the first time.56 Still, the Torture
Convention did not exhibit the same care in defining what it meant by
"other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" as it did in
defining torture.57 The Torture Convention defines torture as follows:
Any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from
him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an
act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having commit-
ted, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason
based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is
inflicted by or at the instigation of ... a public official or other person
acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising
only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.
58
In adopting the Torture Convention, the United States Senate clarified
the meaning of the convention by adopting reservations requiring specific
intent and better defining the concept of mental suffering:
[T]he United States understands that, in order to constitute torture, an act
must be specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or
suffering and that mental pain or suffering refers to prolonged mental
harm caused by or resulting from: (1) the intentional infliction or
threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering; (2) the
administration or application, or threatened administration or application,
of mind altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt
profoundly the sense or the personality; (3) the threat of imminent death;
or (4) the threat that another person will imminently be subjected to death,
severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or application of
mind altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt
profoundly the senses or personality.59




59 136 CONG. REC. S17, 491 (1994).
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The Torture Convention is strict in its ban on torture. Article 2 of the
Torture Convention absolutely excludes exceptional circumstances as an
exception to the prohibition of torture, stating that "[n]o exceptional
circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war,
internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked
as a justification for torture."60
As noted, the phrases "other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment"'" and "ill-treatment '6 2 are not defined in the
Torture Convention.63 In fact, the Torture Convention only addresses ill-
treatment in Article 16 and merely obliges each State party to the document
to "undertake to prevent ... other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment."'
The goal of the Torture Convention is to "make more effective the
struggle against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment throughout the world."65 The distinction between torture and
ill-treatment is best viewed as two sides of the same formula, with torture,
quite understandably, being predominate. Clearly, a greater stigma is
associated with the insidious evil of torture so that all intuitively realize
that international law forbids torture, even if few are cognizant of the fact
that ill-treatment is also prohibited. While all acts of torture must necessar-
ily include ill-treatment, not all acts of ill-treatment constitute torture.
Interrogation practices that do not rise to the level of ill-treatment may be
repugnant by degree, but would be perfectly legal under international law.66
It is thus efficacious to begin the discussion by pointing out the differences
between torture and ill-treatment as they have significant ramifications
regarding State Party obligations.
Article 3 of the Torture Convention prohibits any State Party from
"expel[ling], return[ing] ("refouler") or extradit[ing] a person to another
State where there are substantial grounds" to believe that the person will be
subjected to torture.6 7 In making this determination, the State Party is
required "take into account all relevant considerations" with particular
regard to whether there exists "a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or
60 Torture Convention, supra note 43, at 197. Article 2 also states that superior
orders may not be invoked as a defense to torture. Id.
61 Id. at 198.
62 See, e.g., Grosso, supra note 38, at 308.
63 Torture Convention, supra note 43, at 198.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 197.
66 See infra notes 198-99, 296-98, and accompanying text.
67 Torture Convention, supra note 43, at 198.
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mass violations of human rights. 68 Although this standard provides
considerable flexibility for a State Party to justify particular interpretations,
the prohibition at least establishes a standard.69 Contrastingly, Article 16
has no similar requirement regarding ill-treatment.7" This means that under
the Torture Convention a State Party may freely hand over an individual to
a State that it knows engages in ill-treatment.
Additionally, Article 4 requires each State Party to ensure that torture
is a criminal offense under its domestic criminal law,71 and Article 12
dictates each State Party to investigate any torture allegations under its
jurisdiction when reasonable grounds exist to believe that such acts have
occurred.72 Article 7 further requires the State Party to either extradite the
alleged torturer or "submit the case to its competent [domestic] authorities
for the purpose of prosecution. 73 Article 15 excludes from evidence all
statements elicited through torture,74 while Article 14 requires the State
Party to make compensation to the victims of torture.75
Article 16 does not require the criminalization of ill-treatment in
domestic penal codes, the prosecution of individuals charged with ill-
treatment, or limitations on interpretation. 76 Article 16 additionally does not
require compensation for the victims of ill-treatment or the exclusion of
statements obtained from ill-treatment as evidence at a criminal trial.77
According to one commentator, "[t]he failure to strengthen article 16
appears to have been based on a belief that the concept of cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment was too vague a legal standard upon
which to base legal culpability and judgments.""
The inherent vagueness of ill-treatment's definition and the Torture
Convention's reluctance to fully define the concept or provide even a
minimum level of sanction to the practice has been further aggravated by






74 Id. A statement obtained through torture, however, may be used in the trial




78 Lippman, supra note 46, at 319.
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in Ireland v. United Kingdom.79 The Ireland court found certain interroga-
tion practices of English authorities investigating suspected terrorism in
Northern Ireland to be "inhuman and degrading" (i.e., ill-treatment) under
the European Convention on Human Rights, but not severe enough to rise
to the level of torture.8" According to the court, the finding of ill-treatment
rather than torture "derives principally from a difference in the intensity of
the suffering inflicted."'" The judgment of the Ireland court involved the
use of five interrogation techniques used by British authorities.82 These
techniques included:
" Wall-standing: forcing the detainees to stand for some period of
hours in a "stress position" described as "spreadeagled against the
wall, with ... fingers put high above the head against the wall, the
legs spread apart and the feet back, causing them to stand on their
toes with the weight of the body mainly on the fingers."83 Wall-
standing was practiced for up to 30 hours with occasional periods
for rest.84
" Hooding: placing a dark hood over the head of the detainee and
keeping it on for prolonged periods of time, removing it only for
interrogation.85
" Deprivation of sleep: depriving detainees of sleep for prolonged
periods of time.86
* Deprivation of food and drink: reducing the food and drink to
suspects pending interrogations."
Finally, real world enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance with
the Torture Convention's prohibition on torture and ill-treatment are wholly
'9 Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25 (1978).
80 Id. at 79-80 (noting the distinction in Article 3 of the European Convention
on Human Rights between torture and inhuman or degrading treatment).
" Id. Of the seventeen judges on the panel, thirteen held that the five techniques
did not constitute torture. See id.at Holding 1.4. Sixteen of the judges held that the
five techniques were "ill-treatment." See id. at Holding 1.3.
82 See id. at 59. These techniques were used for four or five days at a time. See
Emanuel Gross, Legal Aspects of Tackling Terrorism: The Balance Between the
Right of a Democracy to Defend Itself and the Protection of Human Rights, 6
UCLA J. INT'L LAW & FOREIGN AFF. 89, 129 (2001).
83 Ireland, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 59.
84 See Gross, supra note 82, at 131.
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inadequate. This is because the individual State Party is expected to police
itself and, if this fails, the only remaining hope for meaningful pressure is
international condemnation from the court of world opinion."8 While the
Torture Convention created an investigatory body called the Committee
Against Torture, its responsibilities revolve around a complex maze of
reports and recommendations which have generally accomplished very
little. 9 The biggest stick wielded by the Committee Against Torture is the
threat that it may provide an unfavorable summary of a particular country
in its yearly report.90 As always, the chief enforcement tool in a democracy
is the rule of law coupled with the judgment of its citizens; civilized
peoples are repulsed by the concept of torture and ill-treatment. Levels of
compliance in totalitarian regimes, however, are dismal with any minimal
progress achieved only through the pressure that democracies may apply
via economic or political leverage.
B. United States Domestic Law
The United States has its own history of using torture and ill-treatment
to elicit confessions in criminal investigations, particularly in the early part
of the last century. By 1931, torture by local law enforcement had become
so common that a special government fact finding body, the National
Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement (the Wickersham
Commission), was established to investigate the matter.9' The Commission
issued a report detailing abusive police interrogation practices.92
Federal law currently defines torture as "an act committed by a person
acting under the color of the law specifically intended to inflict severe
physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental
to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody or physical
control. 93
While domestic acts of torture are punishable as common law crimes,
Section 2340A makes it a federal offense for an American national to
88 See Lippman, supra note 46, at 320-21 (describing State Parties' limited
reporting obligations).
89 See id. at 319-24.
90 See Torture Convention, supra note 43, at 200.
' See NAT'L COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON
LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT (1931).
92 See id.
93 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2003).
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commit or attempt to commit torture outside the United States.94 Addition-
ally, in 1992 Congress passed the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991
that opened United States courts to civil law damage suits by any individual
"who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign
nation," violates international law regarding torture.95 The Act defines
torture as follows:
[A]ny act, directed against an individual in the offender's custody or
physical control, by which severe pain or suffering (other than pain or
suffering arising only from or inherent in, or incidental to, lawful
sanctions), whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on that
individual for such purposes as obtaining from that individual or a third
person information or a confession, punishing that individual for an act
that individual or a third person has committed or is suspected of having
committed, intimidating or coercing that individual or a third person, or
for any reason based on discrimination of any kind .... 96
IH. ALLEGATIONS OF UNITED STATES SANCTIONED TORTURE
"The [Americans] are engaging in good-oldfashioned torture, as people
would have understood it in the Dark Ages. 97
Richard Bourke
94 Id. § 2340A. The statute states in part:
Whoever outside the United States commits or attempts to commit torture
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both,
and if death results to any person from conduct prohibited by this subsec-
tion, shall be punished by death or imprisoned for any term of years or for
life.
Id.
" Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-256, § 2, 106 Stat. 73
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2003)).96 Id. § 3.
9 Foreign Staff, U.S. Tortures Camp X-ray Suspects, Says Lawyer, SCOTSMAN,
Oct. 9, 2003 (quoting Richard Bourke); see Terror Suspects Tortured Claim AAP,
MERCURY (Hobart, Australia), Oct. 9, 2003, at WL 65804870. Richard Bourke is
an Australian lawyer based in the United States who works with detainees at Camp
X-Ray. See generally Jim Puzzanghera, Lindh to Seek Release Today at the
Taliban Fighter's Bail Hearing, His Attorneys Will Argue That He Was Held in
"Highly Coercive" Conditions After Capture, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Feb. 6,
2002, at Al (claiming John Walker Lind had been kept in a metal shipping
container, blindfolded, and immobilized by hand and foot shackles and duct tape
that bound his naked body to a stretcher).
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Law enforcement possesses four means to achieve the goal of an
antiterrorism effort-stopping or eliminating the terrorists before they
commit attacks: (1) using informants and undercover agents to infiltrate the
terror cell (known as HUMINT sources);9" (2) using surveillance, searches
and wiretaps to learn of locations, organizational structure, and plans for
future attacks; (3) arresting and detaining terrorists before they commit a
terrorist attack; and (4) interrogating terrorists. This section only focuses
upon the fourth method, interrogation of those detained as suspected
terrorists.
Since the War on Terror began, the United States has detained
hundreds of individuals that can be grouped into one of four categories: (1)
those suspected of having links to al-Qieda and other terror movements; (2)
those designated as enemy combatants;99 (3) those detained as prisoners of
war in the Iraq military campaign; and (4) those who have been appre-
hended since the close of major combat operations in Iraq and designated
as "security detainees." 0° Most of those detained in the first category were
apprehended by federal law enforcement personnel on the heels of the
September 11,2001 attacks,' 10 and, after questioning, almost five hundred
" But see Kevin Johnson & Toni Locy, FBI Says it Can't Infiltrate al-Qaeda,
USA TODAY, Sept. 11, 2003, at AI (discussing the reasons that the FBI is unable
to place undercover agents into the al-Qdeda terror network).
" "[M]ore than 3,000 al Qa'eda operatives and associates have been detained
in more than 100 countries" since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2003.
Richard A. Serrano & Greg Miller, 100 Terrorist Attacks Thwarted, US. Says,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2003, at A12.
"0 Ian Fisher, 8 Mystery Detainees Held, Six Claim They're Americans, Other
2 Say They're British, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Sept. 17, 2003, at A5 (indicating
that as of September 2003 as many as 4400 people are being held as "security
detainees").
'01 See generally ADDICOTT, supra note 2. A week after the terror attacks of
September 11, 2001, Congress by joint resolution, passed by every member of the
Congress save one, specifically authorized the President of the United States
to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organiza-
tions, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such
organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international
terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or
persons.
Joint Resolution Against Afghanistan, supra note 2, § 2(a).
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were deported as illegal aliens."2 The vast majority of those in the third
group have since been released.'0 3
Detainees in the second group are members or supporters of the al-
Qdeda network captured on the battlefields of Afghanistan, although the
United States has also apprehended other suspected al-Qdeda members in
places other than military combat zones. 'O At least two enemy combatants,
Ali Saleh Kahlah Al-Marri"'0 and Jose Padilla,"°6 have been arrested in the
United States.0 7 Most of the individuals in the second category are
currently housed in several locations outside the territorial United States,
including Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; Afghanistan; and Diego Garcia.'08 Those
in the fourth group are being held in Iraq during its reconstruction.
The second and fourth group of individuals-enemy combatants and
security detainees-have generally been subjected to extended interroga-
tion, but few have been released from detention. '" Apart from concerns
regarding interrogation methods used on these individuals, this situation
has produced a central concern regarding whether the United States can
detain these individuals indefinitely without trial or access to counsel.
102 Greg Krikorian, When in Doubt, Kick Out? FBI Teams Track Immigrant
Terrorism Suspects at Great Cost, Yet They May Not Find Conclusive Evidence.
Deportation Emerges as Quick Fix, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2002, at Al.
'03 Telephone Interview with Colonel Bill Hudson, Jr., Staff Judge Advocate,
United States Army Third Infantry Division (Jan. 9, 2004).
104 See, e.g., Associated Press, U.S. Removes Five From Malawi, WASH. POST,
June 26, 2003, at A26 (noting that five alleged terrorist financiers were flown out
ofMalawi by U.S. agents); Rajiv Chandrasekaran & Peter Finn, U.S. Behind Secret
Transfer of Terror Suspects, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 2002, at A l (reporting that
U.S. forces had apprehended five Algerians and a Yemeni in Bosnia and taken
them to Guantanamo Bay).
05 See Kevin Johnson, Al-Qaeda Suspect Moved to Military Custody, USA
TODAY, June 24, 2003, at A3. Al-Marri is a Qatari national being held in a Navy
brig in Charleston, South Carolina. See id.
'0' See Serrano & Miller, supra note 99.
'07 A third American citizen designated as an enemy combatant is Yaser Esam
Hamdi. Hamdi is being held in Norfolk, Virginia at the Navy brig. See Laura
Taylor Swain, Liberty in the Balance: The Role of the Third Branch in a Time of
Insecurity, 37 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 51, 59-60 (2004).
10' Mark Bowden, The Dark Art of Interrogation, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct.
2003, at 51, 54 (noting twelve countries in which detainees are being held).
09 Ordinarily, the law of war requires that prisoners be released upon the
cessation of hostilities. See DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL 27-10, THE
LAW OF LAND WARFARE XVII (1956), http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atd.dll/
fm/27-10/ [hereinafter FM 27-10].
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There have been several legal challenges to the Bush administration's
designation and handling of the detainees, particularly at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba. Although the majority of the federal courts hearing these challenges
have upheld the administration's view of the terrorism cases,"0 the United
States Supreme Court has granted certiorari to several key cases, with
decisions expected in summer 2004."' The central claim in all of these
disputes centers on the status and detention issues.
A group of clergy, lawyers, and academics brought one of the first legal
challenges in a California federal court in 2002. In Coalition of Clergy,
Lawyers, and Professors v. Bush, the plaintiff group sought habeas corpus
relief on behalf of the detainees." 2 The district court held that the plaintiff
group lacked standing to raise the issue,' " and hinted in a footnote that the
Supreme Court's holding in Johnson v. Eisentrager"4 would serve as a
"formidable obstacle" to granting habeas corpus relief for the detainees
since they were aliens being held outside the geographic borders of the
United States." 5 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
rejected a similar claim for habeas corpus relief on procedural grounds in
Al Odah v. United States.' 16 The Al Odah Court specifically cited Johnson
and found that "Cuba--not the United States-has sovereignty over
Guantanamo Bay.""' Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
"
0 See James Gordon Meek, Supremes to Rule on Gitmo Detainees, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS, Nov. 11, 2003, at 10 (noting that the lower federal courts have so far
deferred to the Executive Branch in the prosecution of the War on Terror).
. See Lyle Denniston, High Court Accepts Case on Detention of US Citizens,
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 10, 2004, at Al.
12 Coalition of Clergy, Lawyers, and Professors v. Bush, 310 F.3d 1153 (9th
Cir. 2002).
"
3 Id. at 1164.
114 Id. (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950)). The Johnson case
involved habeas corpus relief for German spies captured in China and imprisoned
in Germany after the close of World War 1I. The Supreme Court held that German
nationals, confined in custody of United States Army in Germany following
conviction by military commission of having engaged in military activity against
United States in China after surrender of Germany, had no right to writ of habeas
corpus to test legality of their detention. Johnson, 339 U.S. at 778.
"' See Coalition of Clergy, 310 F.3d at 1164 n.4 ("There is no question that the
holding in Johnson represents a formidable obstacle to the rights of the detainees
at Camp X-Ray to the writ of habeas corpus; it is impossible to ignore, as the case
well matches the extraordinary circumstances here.").
16 Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 124 S.
Ct. 534 (2003).
" Id. at 1143. The United States gained control over Guantanamo Bay pursuant
to a 1934 treaty. See id. at 1142.
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ruled in December 2003 that the Guantanamo Bay detainees can have
access to American courts." 8 The Supreme Court will resolve this issue
when it renders its decision in a similar case involving a request by several
families of Guantanamo Bay detainees who want to be allowed access to
United States courts to contest the detainees' status and detention.' 19
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Fourth Circuit reaffirmed the proposition
that the President has the constitutional authority to designate and detain
"enemy combatants," including those who are American citizens, in time
of war. 20 If one accepts the proposition that the War on Terror is not a
metaphor but a real state of war, then it is fundamentally clear that the
President can use his Article II powers to designate and then detain enemy
combatants, including those who are United States citizens. During World
War II, for instance, the United States detained hundreds of thousands of
German, Italian, and Japanese prisoners, some of whom were American
citizens, for years without counsel, access to family, or trial.2 '
The purpose of detaining enemy combatants is not to punish the enemy
combatant, but to protect the holding nation from future acts of violence by
118 See Gherebi v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1278, 1284 (9th Cir. 2003). For an excellent
discussion, see John Mintz, Hearing Ordered for Terrorism Detainee: 9th Circuit
Ruling Could Lead to Court Dates for Others at Guantanamo Bay, WASH. POST,
Dec. 19, 2003, at A19.
" Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 534 (2003). The petition for a writ of certiorari to
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in this
consolidated case was granted and limited to the issue: "Whether United States
Courts lack jurisdiction to consider challenges to the legality of the detention of
foreign nationals captured abroad in connection with hostilities and incarcerated
at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba." Id.
20 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 281, 283 (4th Cir. 2002), cert. granted,
124 S. Ct. 981 (2004). In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 459 (4th Cir. 2003),
the court concluded that a declaration submitted by the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy "setting forth what the government contends were the circumstances of
Hamdi's capture was sufficient by itself to justify his detention... [and] that the
Commander in Chief has constitutionally detained Hamdi pursuant to the war
powers entrusted to him by the United States Constitution." Id.; see also
Colepaugh v. Looney, 235 F.2d 429, 432 (10th Cir. 1956) ("[T]he petitioner's
citizenship in the United States does not divest the [Military] Commission of
jurisdiction over him, or confer upon him any constitutional rights not accorded any
other belligerent under the laws of war."); In re Territo, 156 F.2d 142, 144 (9th Cir.
1946) ("[I]t is immaterial to the legality of petitioner's detention as a prison of war
... whether petitioner is or is not a [U.S.] citizen."); Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp.
2d 564, 587-91 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 1353 (2004) (detention
of American citizens designated as enemy combatants).
121 See Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31, 37 (1942).
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ensuring that they do not return to join enemy forces, and, in this unique
situation, to allow American officials the opportunity to gather any
necessary intelligence about the terrorist's organizational infrastructure,
financial networks, communication systems, weapon supply lines, and
plans for future terror attacks. 1
22
In short, the Supreme Court's 2004 decisions will turn on whether or
not it accepts the premise that America is "at war." If it does, the Court will
likely resolve these matters in the government's favor, granting terrorists
and other unlawful combatants who violate the laws of war no greater
protections than would be accorded to enemy prisoners of war.
The group of detainees that has received the most attention consists of
the 600 plus men held at a specially built facility named Camp Delta in
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Although the Bush administration says all of the
detainees are participants in the War on Terror, it has not recognized their
eligibility for prisoner of war status under the Third Geneva Convention. 23
The Third Geneva Convention does not apply because both the Taliban
fighters and the al-Qdeda fighters fail to qualify as lawful enemy combat-
ants under the applicable provisions of international law. 24 Prisoner of war
status is conferred on individuals who are "[m]embers of the armed forces
of a Party to the conflicts" 125 as well as "[m]embers of other militias and
members of other volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance
movements, belonging to a Party ... provided that such ... fulfill[s]" four
specific conditions:
(a) That of being commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates;
(b) That of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) That of carrying arms openly; and
(d) That of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws
and customs of war.' 26
22 See FM 27-10, supra note 109, 97.
123 See Geneva Convention, Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug.
12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3316,75 U.N.T.S. 135, http://www.unher.ch/htmulmenu3ib/9 1.
htm [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention].
124 See United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d. 541, 557-58 (E.D. Va. 2002)
(finding that the Taliban fighters who fought on behalf of the government of
Afghanistan did not qualify for lawful combatant status); Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d
at 568-69. In the case of New York-born Jose Padilla, the so-called "dirty bomber"
was arrested as a material witness but later designated as an "enemy combatant" by
the President of the United States. Id.




Although the armed conflict against the al-Qaeda involves the use of
American armed force against an organization that is not another nation's
armed force, the Bush administration'27 nevertheless rightly recognized that
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 applied in the combat operations in
Afghanistan, but that the enemy al-Q~eda detainees were not entitled to
prisoner of war status, 128 since they are not recognized members of an
armed force meeting the four criteria set out above. 29 Even in the best light
possible, these individuals are "illegal enemy combatants"'3°--still
responsible for breaches of the law of war but not entitled to prisoner of
war status.
Similarly, the Bush administration deemed that the captured Taliban
fighters were unlawful combatants because they did not "wear distinctive
military insignia, i.e., uniforms which would make them distinguishable
from the civilian population at a distance."'' The Bush administration
further found that the Taliban forfeited any claim to prisoner of war status
because they had "adopted and provided support to the unlawful terrorist
objectives of the al-Qdieda."' 3 2
'27 The President alone is invested with the entire charge of conducting hostile
operations during wartime, including the power to determine whether a particular
person should be declared an enemy combatant. See generally Hamilton v. Dillin,
88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 73, 87 (1874); see also Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763,
788 (1950).
2' The Geneva Conventions come into effect in the event of an international
armed conflict regardless of how domestic law characterizes that conflict. See
generally ADDICOTT, supra note 2, at 62-63. But see Erwin Chemerinsky, By
Flouting War Laws, US. Invites Tragedy, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2003, at BI
(arguing that the United States is in clear violation of international law).
129 The United States has not ratified the Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of Aug. 12, 1946, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts, June 8,1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, http://www.unhchr.
ch/html/menu3/b/93.htm. Commonly known as Protocol I, this instrument seeks to
extend coverage of non-international conflicts in which "persons are fighting
against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the
exercise of their rights to self-determination." Id. at art. 1.4. See Abraham Sofaer,
The U.S. Decision Not to Ratify Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions on the
Protection of War Victims, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 784 (1988).
30 The term "illegal enemy combatants" is taken from Ex Parte Quirin, 317
U.S. 1 (1943). The unlawful combatants in Quirin were German saboteurs who
entered the United States surreptitiously and proceeded, without wearing distinctive
uniforms, to engage in sabotage. All were subsequently captured and tried by an
American military commission for violating the law of war. Id. at 20-22.
131 ADDICOTT, supra note 2, at 63.
132 But see id. (arguing that the adoption of the goals of the al-Qieda would not
deprive the Taliban of prisoner of war status).
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In Padilla v. Bush, the District Court adopted the Bush administration's
analysis when it considered the status of Jose Padilla,' an American
citizen arrested in Chicago and detained as an enemy combatant.
[T]he President designated Padilla an "enemy combatant" based on his
alleged association with al Qaeda and on an alleged plan undertaken as
part of that association. The point of the protracted discussion immedi-
ately above is simply to support what should be an obvious conclusion:
when the President designated Padilla an "enemy combatant," he
necessarily meant that Padilla was an unlawful combatant, acting as an
associate of a terrorist organization whose operations do not meet the four
criteria necessary to confer lawful combatant status on its members and
adherents.... [E]ven the Taliban militia, who appear at least to have
acted in behalf of a government in Afghanistan, were found by Judge Ellis
in Lindh not to qualify for lawful combatant status.'3 4
The Second Circuit, however, ordered the Pentagon in December 2003
to release Padilla, who had been held in military confinement since July
2003.13' The United States appealed the order, and the Supreme Court has
agreed to hear the appeal.'36
Despite the fact that the Third Geneva Convention does not apply to
these enemy combatants, the Bush administration has pledged that all
detainees will be treated in accordance with the humanitarian concerns set
out in the Geneva Conventions. 37 The detainees accordingly receive
regular visits by the International Committee of the Red Cross, diplomats
from their respective nations, military attorneys, and various other fact-
finding groups.
38
131 Padilla is suspected of being an al-Qdeda member plotting an attack on the
United States with a "dirty" bomb.
'34 Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 593 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (citations
omitted) (emphasis added).
131 Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 718 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S.
Ct. 1168 (2004) (holding that absent specific congressional authorization the
President lacks inherent constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief to detain
American citizens on American soil outside a zone of combat).
136 id.
13' ADDIcoTT, supra note 2, at 63.
"' Coalition of Clergy, Lawyers, and Professors v. Bush, 310 F.3d 1153 (2002).
The Ninth Circuit noted that the detainees received visits by the Red Cross and
diplomats from their respective countries. Id. at 1157; Telephone Interview with
Colonel Manuel Supervielle, Staff Judge Advocate for the United States Southern
Command (Apr. 5, 2003).
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The precise status of "enemy combatant" is pivotal in determining what
interrogation techniques can be used to gather information from the subject
detainee. Article 17 of the Third Geneva Convention provides that
prisoners of war are only required to give their "surname, first names and
rank, date of birth, and army, regimental, personal or serial number, or
failing this, equivalent information."139 The prisoner of war is not required
to give any further information upon questioning. 40 To leave no doubt on
this point, Article 17 goes on to provide the following:
No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be
inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind
whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened,
insulted, or exposed to any unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of
any kind.'
4 1
Certainly, if the Third Geneva Convention covers detainees, American
authorities would not be entitled to interrogate them or obtain additional
information. Conversely, enemy combatants who are not prisoners of war
do not benefit from the Third Geneva Convention's protections and may
therefore be further questioned by American interrogators.
One allegation that has not received treatment in any American court
is the charge of torture or ill-treatment by American officials of certain
detainees. These claims generally regard the issue of interrogations, but
also extend to criticisms of the detainees' living conditions.142 Some have
claimed that even if the detainees may be held and questioned, the process
of deciding what do to with more than 600 detainees in Guantanamo Bay
is far too lengthy.143 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has responded
that the process of determining what to do with each detainee is slow
because each case must be reviewed by various federal agencies including
the Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA") and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation ("FBI"). 44 Still, Rumsfeld has pledged that yearly reviews
are planned for the Guantanamo detainees.'45
' Third Geneva Convention, supra note 123, art. 17, 75 U.N.T.S. at 148.
140 IN.
"' Id. (emphasis added).
142 See Kate Randall, US Subjects Iraqi Detainees to "Inhuman Treatment"
(July 2003), at http://www.wsws.org/articles/2003/jul2003/det-j04.shtml (citing
Amnesty International's claims that for the initial week of detainment many Iraqi
detainees were denied access to water and toilet facilities).
"' Stephen J. Hedges, 13 Detainees Released, 647 in Limbo at Guantanamo,
CHI. TRIB., May 9, 2003, at Al.
144Id.
"' John J. Lumpkin, Yearly Reviews Planned for Guantanamo Detainees, CHI.
SUN-TIMES, Feb. 14, 2004, at 3.
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As stated, since the detainees are not entitled to prisoner of war status,
international law does not forbid interrogation so long as it is conducted
without torture or ill-treatment. Furthermore, since the vast majority of the
detainees are aliens located outside the United States, they are not entitled
to Constitutional protections under the Fifth16 and Fourteenth'47 Amend-
ments. The primary protection against torture or ill-treatment is the Torture
Convention which is effectively unenforceable by the international
community.
A. Torture Allegations
The United States government's position on the question of torture is
that it does not engage in torture or other ill-treatment 148 in questioning or
housing detainees. National Security Council spokesman Sean McCormack
exemplifies the official stand: "The United States is treating enemy
combatants in U.S. government control, wherever held, humanely and in a
manner consistent with the principles of the Third Geneva Convention of
1949." 49 This does not mean that the United States does not fully question
detainees at a variety of levels. Government officials responsible for
gathering information from detainees certainly employ the full range of
permissible interrogation tactics. 50 This includes offering various
incentives such as money, or engaging in trickery.' 5 '
Suggestions by various unnamed government sources that American
interrogators might be forced to engage in physical pressure to get
information from suspected terrorists surfaced almost immediately after the
September 11, 2001 attacks. 52 In October, 2001, a Washington Post article
'" United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (holding that
extraterritorial application of the Fifth Amendment was not available for aliens).
14' Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (2002) (holding Fourteenth Amendment
protects resident aliens; however, aliens only receive constitutional protection when
they come within territory of the United States and develop substantial connections
with this country).
141 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (2003) (denouncing the use of torture).
149 Priest & Gellnan, supra note 19.
150 See id. ("[I]nterrogators['] ... methods include feigned friendship, respect,
cultural sensitivity, and, in some cases, money.").
I' Id.
152 Walter Pincus, Silence of 4 Terror Probe Suspects Poses Dilemma for FBI,
WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 2001, at A6. This article also relied on retired agents who




served as the information source of choice to those who accused the United
States of torture.15 3 The Washington Post article quoted an unnamed FBI
agent as stating:
We are known for humanitarian treatment, so basically we are stuck ....
Usually there is some incentive, some angle to play, what you can do for
them. But it could get to that spot where we could go to pressure...
where we won't have a choice, and we are probably getting there.' 54
In March of 2002, the Washington Post once again relied on unnamed
sources to alert its readers that the United States government had turned
over dozens of suspected terrorists "to countries, including Egypt and
Jordan, whose intelligence services have close ties to the CIA and where
they can be subjected to interrogation tactics-including torture and threats
to families--that are illegal in the United States ... Essentially, the
article insinuated that the United States engaged in "rendition."' 56 While an
unnamed source in a media article may view a particular country as a nation
that satisfies this test, it is ultimately a question for the United States
government and the international community to answer.
It is impossible to accurately gauge what interrogation methods a
particular State uses without more evidence than that provided by unnamed
sources. Additionally, from a legal perspective, there is no international
prohibition against rendering a suspected terrorist to a nation that engages
in interrogation practices that would constitute ill-treatment.'57 For
" See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, "Precommitment "and "Postcommitment ": The
Ban on Torture in the Wake of September 11, 81 TEX. L. REV. 2013, 2020 (2003)
(citing Pincus, supra note 152, for the possibility that the United States might
engage in applying physical pressure to obtain information).
'14 Pincus, supra note 152.
' Rajiv Chandrasekaran & Peter Finn, U.S. Behind Secret Transfer of Terror
Suspects, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 2002, at Al. "After September 11, these sorts of
movements have been occurring all the time," a U.S. diplomat said. "It allows us
to get information from terrorists in a way we can't do on U.S. soil." Id.
56 See Priest & Gellman, supra note 19. As previously noted, rendition is a
common practice which is only improper under international law if, for instance,
the United States knowingly delivers a suspect to a nation that it has substantial
grounds to believe engages in "a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass
violations of human rights." See Torture Convention, supra note 43, at 197.
' 7See Torture Convention, supra note 43, at 197. It is a violation of the Torture
Convention to extradite an individual to a country that knowingly uses torture
however, the Convention provides no similar prohibition on the extradition of
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example, assuming that Jordan uses some amount of physical or physiologi-
cal pressure in its interrogation practices, one must determine whether that
type of pressure rises to the level of torture, or only ill-treatment.158
It was not until December 26, 2002, that the public was alerted to the
concept of "stress and duress" tactics allegedly used by American
interrogators. According to the initial Washington Post story, various
unnamed government sources suggested that the United States used a
laundry list of questionable techniques to get uncooperative detainees
housed outside the United States to talk. The article stated: "Those who
refuse to cooperate.., are sometimes kept standing or kneeling for hours,
in black hoods or spray-painted goggles .... At times they are held in
awkward, painful positions and deprived of sleep with a 24-hour bombard-
ment of lights." Other examples of stress and duress listed were so-called
"false flag" operations in which the detainee is deceived into believing he
has been turned over to a "country with a reputation for brutality," or
having female interrogators question the detainee, "a psychologically
jarring experience for men reared in a conservative Muslim culture where
women are never in control."' 59
The article also alleged that when detainees were first apprehended,
"MPs [military police] and U.S. Army Special Forces troops... [would]
beat them up and confine them in tiny rooms."' 60 To buttress this view, the
article then quoted another unnamed American official as saying: "[Olur
guys may kick them around a little bit in the adrenaline of the immediate
aftermath [of the arrest] ."'6
Ultimately, if such stress and duress tactics failed to glean meaningful
results, the article reported that the detainees were rendered to other
countries where they could be subjected to mistreatment or "mind-altering
drugs such as sodium pentathol."'62 However, the Washington Post article
placed a caveat on its claims about rendition practices by noting that the
CIA's "Directorate of Operations instructions, drafted in cooperation with
individuals to countries that participate in behavior that only rises to the level of ill-
treatment. Id.
' Cf Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, 79 (1978) (noting that
to fall within the prohibition of the Torture Convention, the treatment must "attain
a minimum level of severity").
"9 Priest & Gellman, supra note 19.
160 Id. ("The alleged terrorists were commonly blindfolded and thrown into





the general counsel, tells case officers in the field that they may not engage
in, provide advice about or encourage the use of torture by cooperating
intelligence services from other countries." '163 Since the publication of the
stress and duress story a handful of similar second hand reports found their
way into the media, most of them loudly claiming that the United States
tortures suspects. 164
B. What Exactly Do American Interrogators Do?
Numerous elements of the government play direct roles in gathering
timely intelligence about terrorist networks in the War on Terror. The
primary responsibilities are shared by the CIA, the FBI and the Department
of Defense ("DOD"). The CIA has primary responsibility for terrorist
matters outside the United States 165 and the FBI has primary responsibility
for terrorist matters in the United States." s The DOD relies chiefly on the
Defense Intelligence Agency ("DIA"), a DOD support agency with "over
7000 military and civilian employees" stationed throughout the world. 167
What do American interrogators do once a terrorist suspect is detained?
This question is difficult to address because the government refuses to
detail its interrogation methods. The standard government response
concentrates on emphasizing to the public that the United States complies
with the applicable laws and standards without detailing interrogation
tactics. For instance, in responding to complaints by Human Rights Watch
last year, White House spokesman Scott McClellan responded: "[W]e
believe we are in full compliance with domestic and international law,
including domestic and international law dealing with torture." 168 Interest-
ingly, Mr. McClellan's statement specifically mentioned torture and not ill-
treatment.
163 Id.
4 See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
165 See Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec. 4, 1981) (defining
the purpose of the Central Intelligence Agency as, among other things, conducting
counterintelligence activities outside the United States).
'66 See id. (assigning intelligence and counterintelligence functions within the
United States to the FBI).
167 See Declaration of Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby (USN), Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency [hereinafter Jacoby Declaration]. This declaration
was submitted to the court in Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 567 (S.D.N.Y.
2002), cert. granted sub nom. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 1353 (2004).
168 Cooperman, supra note 20.
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In tandem with the government's refusal to detail any specifics about
its interrogation techniques, open source documents available to the public
provide only broad generalizations on interrogation techniques. One of
those documents, Army Field Manual 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation
("FM 34-52"), 169 clearly prohibits torture or physical stress techniques in
conducting interrogation. 70 Thus, gleaning real world details about the
mechanics of interrogation requires reliance on domestic and international
media sources.
The Wall Street Journal attempted to uncover information about
current interrogation practices in the War on Terror by publishing a front
page story in April 2002.' The story covered the training given to Army
interrogators at the United States Army's interrogation school located in
Fort Huachuca, Arizona.' The reporter began the piece by making the
following observation:
.Interrogators-the Pentagon renamed them "human intelligence collec-
tors" last year---are authorized not just to lie, but to prey on a prisoner's
ethnic stereotypes, sexual urges and religious prejudices, his fear for his
family's safety, or his resentment of his fellows. They'll [Anny interroga-
tors] do just about everything short of torture, which officials say is not
taught here, to make their prisoners spill information that could save
American lives.
173
The Wall Street Journal piece went on to list some of the techniques
that are taught at the school to get prisoners to talk. 71 These techniques
included the "incentive" approach,'75 the "fear-up" approach, 76 the "fear-
169 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL 34-52, INTELLIGENCE INTERRO-
GATION (1992).
170 Id.
17 Jess Bravin, Interrogation School Tells Army Recruits How Grilling Works:
30 Techniques in 16 Weeks, Just Short of Torture; Do They YieldMuch?, WALL ST.




171 Id. (describing the "incentive" approach as offering a benefit, real or decep-
tive, to the prisoner in exchange for his cooperation).
176 Id. (describing the "fear-up" approach as "heavy-handed, table-banging vio-
lence"); see also Doug Saunders, War on Terror: US. Walks a Fine Line to Make
Prisoners Talk, Interrogation Teams Allowed to 'Fear Up' Terror Suspects, but




down" approach,'77 the "pride and ego down" approach, 78 and the "pride
and ego up" approach.'79 The article goes on to note that stress posi-
tions 80-- placing prisoners in uncomfortable positions until they talk-are
not taught at the school and that a military lawyer is "on hand during
interrogations, for quick decisions on the degree of physical or mental
pressure allowed."' 81
Nevertheless, no matter how accurate media stories might be on the
subject, the thoughtful observer must pose the following question: If the
government is not engaging in improper interrogation tactics, why won't it
fully reveal its methods? The government's reluctance to release informa-
tion about the exact interrogation techniques used on detainees is obviously
rooted in the need for operational security. If al-Qdeda (or another enemy
group) knows in detail how American interrogation practices operate, they
can develop counter-intelligence techniques to frustrate that process. '82 One
official source available to the public on the issue of the need for secrecy
in the use of interrogations in the War on Terror is the Jacoby
Declaration.'83 The Jacoby Declaration is a nine-page sworn statement
177 See Bravin, supra note 171. The "fear-down" approach "targets terrified
prisoners. Interrogators try to calm them, asking about personal or family life,
eventually interjecting the questions they really want answered. The technique
'may backfire if allowed to go too far,' the manual cautions, raising a prisoner's
self-confidence to the point where he won't feel he has to answer." Id.
178 Id. The "pride and ego down," approach is where interrogators "belittle a
prisoner's 'loyalty, intelligence, abilities, leadership qualities, sloppy appearance
or any other perceived weakness."' This technique is viewed as the "last ditch"
effort. Id.
17 Id. The "pride and ego up" approach is described as "mak[ing] them feel
good [and] that you're their best friend." In this technique, "a prisoner thought to
have been 'looked down upon for a long time' is flattered and made to feel that by
providing information, he can 'show someone that he does indeed have some
brains.' "Id.
"' Id. The article quotes an instructor as telling his students that "placing
prisoners into... 'stress positions' until they talk" is not taught at the school. Id.
181 Id.
182 See Bowden, supra note 108, at 56. "Everybody in the world knows that if
you are arrested by the United States, nothing bad will happen to you." Id. (quoting
a former CIA agent).
183 Jacoby Declaration, supra note 167; see also Serrano & Miller, supra note
99. The Jacoby Declaration disclosed more than one hundred foiled attacks against
the United States. Prosecutors have used the Jacoby Declaration to highlight
interrogations' importance and to stress that if a suspected terrorist is able to meet
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issued to the District Court for the Southern District of New York in
Padilla v. Bush, by Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby (USN), the Director of
the DIA.
In a section entitled, Interrogation Techniques, Jacoby states that the
"approach to interrogation is largely dependent upon creating an atmo-
sphere of dependency and trust between the subject and the interrogator."'14
Creating this atmosphere can take a prolonged period of time. 5 Then, in
a section entitled, Use ofInterrogations in the War on Terrorism,86 Jacoby
devotes several paragraphs to describing asymmetric warfare and the
unique threats posed by terrorists who "have... clearly demonstrated their
willingness-and in fact have expressed their intent--to use any type of
potential weapon, including weapons of mass destruction"'8 7 against the
United States. Jacoby, however, refuses to provide any information
regarding American interrogators' methods. Jacoby states only that the
"United States is now engaged in a robust 188 program of interrogating
individuals who have been identified as enemy combatants in the War on
Terrorism."'8 9 Then, in a last amplification he states: "As detainees
collectively increase their knowledge about United States detention
facilities and methods of interrogation, the potential risk to national
security increases should those methods be released." '90 As of this writing,
as many as ten people who worked as translators or counselors for the
detainees at Guantanamo Bay have been investigated for possible
espionage.' 9'
The initial goal of interrogation is to get the suspect to start talking.
The best way to get reliable and useful information is to treat the sub-
with his lawyer it would seriously "disrupt govemment efforts for his cooperation,"
risk the "loss of a critical intelligence resource," and "result in a grave and direct
threat to national security." Id.
184 Jacoby Declaration, supra note 167, at 4.
"' Id. ("Developing the kind of relationship of trust and dependency necessary
for effective interrogations is a process that can take a significant amount of
time.").
116 Id. at 5-6.
187 Id. at 5.
'
88 Id. at 6 (emphasis added). In the last paragraph of this section Jacoby again
uses the term robust: The necessary intelligence "cannot be obtained without robust
interrogation efforts." Id.
I89 ld. (emphasis added).
i90 Id. (emphasis added).
"9' Eric Schmitt & Thorn Shanker, Fear of Sabotage by Mistranslation at
Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2003, at Al.
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ject humanely,'9 2 and not engage in torture or ill-treatment. When faced
with torture individuals will say anything to stop the pain, thus making
their statements nearly worthless. According to a former Colonel in Army
intelligence: "Anything you can do to disconnect someone is going to
help ... [b]ut it's a myth that torture is effective. The best way to win
someone over is to treat them kindly."' 93 From a practical perspective
this is certainly a fundamental reason that torture should not be em-
ployed-it seldom produces truthful statements, particularly in the case of
hardened zealots willing to engage in suicide missions. If they are willing
to kill and be killed for their cause, they are likely prepared to withstand
torture.
The story of "Half-Dead Bob" typifies the al-Qdeda mind set while
illustrating the American policy of humane treatment of detainees in
accordance with the principles of the Third Geneva Convention.'94 An Arab
captured on the battlefield of Afghanistan was nicknamed Half-Dead Bob
by the Americans when he arrived at Guantanamo Bay.' 9 His nickname
derived from the fact that he came to the detention center weighing sixty-
six pounds, suffering from tuberculosis, shrapnel wounds, and having only
one lung. 96 The article states:
Army Maj. Gen. [Major General] Michael Dunlavey vividly remembers
his first encounter with 'Bob.' Dunlavey ran interrogations at the base
until November of last year. By the time they met, Bob was making a
rapid recovery. He had put on 50 pounds and, sitting across a table from
Dunlavey, he thanked him for the food and medical treatment. 'General,
you are probably a good Christian,' Dunlavey recalls him saying. 'And
you are probably a good man. But if I ever get free, I will kill you. ' 1
97
192 See Juan 0. Tamayo, U.S. Interrogation of Prisoners 'Smooth Process,'
Military Says, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 13, 2002, at A6. The commander of one unit
at Camp X-Ray says, "We treat them in a firm, fair and humane way and they don't
give us any hassles at all." Camp officials report that a "significant number" of
prisoners are cooperating with their interrogators. Id.
193 Julian Borger, Metallica is Latest Interrogation Tactic, GUARDIAN (London),
May 20, 2003, at 11.
'9 See David E. Kaplan et al., Playing Offense: After 9/11, the Gloves Come
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C. What Can United States Interrogators Do?
Saddam Hussein's December 13, 2003 capture once again brought the
issue of acceptable interrogation techniques into the public eye.' 98 Before
Saddam was designated by the United States as a prisoner of war, what
could American authorities do to make Saddam reveal critical information?
Domestic law clearly prohibits torture.'99 The prohibition on torture
under international law is equally clear and many of the practices that
constitute torture are universally accepted as illegal. The waters become
increasingly opaque as one ventures into the realm of ill-treatment and
beyond into techniques that, while questionable, may or may not constitute
ill-treatment, e.g., stress and duress. Additionally, the legal parameters
associated with interrogation techniques depend in part on where the
interrogation takes place. Interrogations conducted by law enforcement
within the United States must not violate constitutional protections, while
interrogations conducted outside the United States, including those
conducted by foreign agents resulting from rendition, provide little hope to
the detainee for judicial review in an American forum.200
The Supreme Court's Chavez v. Martinez °' decision provides some
guidance as to what techniques would be lawful for interrogators to use in
the United States. The central issue in Chavez involved coercive question-
ing by a police officer. 0 2
While "investigating suspected narcotics activity' 2°3 near a vacant lot,
police in Oxnard, California, stopped Oliverio Martinez as he was riding
his bike down a darkened path.204 The police conducted a patdown frisk of
Martinez and discovered a knife in his waistband. An altercation ensued
and police officers claim that Martinez took one of their guns and pointed
it at them.20 5 Officer PeA then drew her service pistol and shot Martinez
several times, 206 leaving him blinded and paralyzed. 207 Martinez was placed
' See James Risen & Thorn Shanker, Hussein Enters Post-9/l l Web of U.S.
Prisons, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2003, at Al.
19 See supra notes 93--96 and accompanying text.
2o0 But see Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2003) ("The district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.").
201 Chavez v. Martinez, 123 S. Ct. 1994 (2003).








under arrest and taken by ambulance to the hospital." 8 Sergeant Ben
Chavez, the patrol supervisor, "accompanied Martinez to the hospital and
then questioned Martinez there while he was receiving treatment from
medical personnel."2 9 The interrogation in the emergency room of the
hospital "lasted a total of about 10 minutes, over a 45-minute period, with
Chavez leaving the emergency room for periods of time to permit medical
personnel to attend to Martinez. '210
Chavez never read Martinez his Miranda warnings during the
interrogation."1 There can be no question that Martinez was disoriented
and in extreme pain throughout the process of interrogation.1 2 Martinez
was at first uncooperative. 213 "At one point, Martinez said 'I am not telling
you anything until they treat me,' yet Chavez continued the interview. '2 4
Martinez later admitted to taking the gun and pointing it at police.1 5 It was
this act that resulted in PeA shooting Martinez.
Although Martinez was never charged with any crime and his
statements were never used against him in a criminal proceeding, he
subsequently filed a claim for damages in the United States District Court
for the Central District of California under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,2,6 alleging
that Sergeant Chavez had violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-




211 Id. at 1999-2000.
212 Id. at 1999. Martinez was shot several times, causing severe injuries that left
Martinez permanently blinded and paralyzed from the waist down. Id.
213 Id. His initial answers were "'I don't know,' 'I am dying,' and 'I am
choking."' Id.
214 Id. Medical personnel were treating Martinez. Id.
215 Id. Chavez also admitted to using heroin regularly. Id.
216 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2003).
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial
officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity,
injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was
violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
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rights.21 7 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
denial of Chavez's defense of qualified immunity and entered summary
judgment in favor of Martinez for both claims. 2 8 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari,21 9 then reversed and remanded the case.220
In seeking guidance for questioning suspected terrorists within the
United States, Chavez is significant for two reasons. First, by overturning
the Ninth Circuit's ruling that "the mere use of compulsive questioning,
without more, violates the Constitution, 22' the Court clearly established
that the Fifth Amendment is not violated when law enforcement agents who
do not intend to use statements in subsequent criminal proceedings
coercively interrogate an unwilling suspect without providing Miranda
222
warnings. 223 The Court held that "mere coercion does not violate the text
of the Self-Incrimination Clause absent use of the compelled statements in
a criminal case against the witness., 224 Thus, the Court held that "the
absence of a 'criminal case' in which Martinez was compelled to be a
'witness' against himself defeats his core Fifth Amendment claim" 225 and
voids any § 1983 action.226 The Court quickly noted that it did not condone
torture or ill-treatment by law enforcement:
Our views on the proper scope of the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimina-
tion Clause do not mean that police torture or other abuse that results in
a confession is constitutionally permissible so long as the statements are
not used in trial; it simply means that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause, rather than the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination
Clause, would govern the inquiry in those cases and provide relief in
appropriate circumstances. 2
27
Second, the ruling left in place the subjective "shock the conscience" 28
standard, taken from Rochin v. California,229 for determining when the
217 Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2000.
218 Id.
219 Id.
220 Id. at 2006.
22 Id. at 2001.
222 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
223 Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2004 (citing Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523
(1987)).224 Id. at 2002.
225 Id. at 2004.
226 Id.
227 Id.
228 Id. at 2005.
229 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
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police cross the threshold for conduct that violates the Fourteenth
Amendment. In Rochin, police officers witnessed the defendant swallow
two capsules which they suspected were illegal substances.230 Officers
handcuffed Rochin and took him to a hospital where a doctor forced an
emetic solution through a tube into his stomach and against his will.
231
Rochin vomited two morphine capsules and was subsequently convicted.232
The Supreme Court overturned the conviction and held that obtaining
evidence by methods that are "so brutal and so offensive to human dignity"
violate the Fourteen Amendment's Due Process Clause.233
[W]e are compelled to conclude that the proceedings by which this
conviction was obtained do more than offend some fastidious squeamish-
ness or private sentimentalism about combatting [sic] crime too energeti-
cally. This is conduct that shocks the conscience .... They are methods
too close to the rack and screw to permit of constitutional differentia-
tion.234
The Chavez Court remanded the issue of whether the facts violated the
Fourteenth Amendment, though at least five of the justices apparently were
not "shocked ' 235 that Sergeant Chavez engaged in a repetitive interrogation
even though Martinez was suffering severe pain.236 Although Sergeant
Chavez may have benefitted from the situation if Martinez subjectively
thought that he had to answer questions in order to get medical treatment,
this was not the case, since medical personnel were treating Martinez
throughout the interrogation period.237 Justice Thomas wrote that "we
cannot agree with Martinez's characterization of Chavez's behavior as
'egregious' or 'conscience shocking.' ,238 The fact that Chavez did not
interfere with medical treatment and did not cause Martinez' s pain (wounds
occurred prior to and totally apart from the questioning process) were
certainly important factors influencing some, but not all, of the justices.239
Justice Stevens, however, saw Sergeant Chavez's interrogation as
tantamount to torture and a clear violation of the Fourteenth Amendment:
230 Id. at 166.
231 Id.
232 Id.
233 Id. at 174.234 Id. at 172 (emphasis added).
235 Chavez v. Martinez, 123 S. Ct. 1994, 2005-06 (2003).
236 Id. at 2006.
237 Id. at 2005.
238 Id.
239Id. at 2005, 2010-11.
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As a matter of fact, the interrogation of respondent was the functional
equivalent of an attempt to obtain an involuntary confession from a
prisoner by torturous methods. As a matter of law that type of brutal
police conduct constitutes an immediate deprivation of the prisoner's
constitutionally protected interest in liberty.
240
Unfortunately, the Court did not provide any new approaches to assist
in defining what constitutes behavior that "shocks the conscience." The
Court was content to cite previous examples from past cases,24' traced from
its decision in Brown v. Mississippi.
24 2
The Brown Court ruled that convictions based on confessions extracted
by law enforcement through methods tantamount to torture violated the
Fourteenth Amendment. 243 The local police in Brown hanged and whipped
a murder suspect until he confessed.244 Other defendants "were made to
strip and ... were laid over chairs and their backs were cut to pieces with
a leather strap with buckles on it ... and in this manner the defendants
confessed to the crime. '24' All of the defendants were convicted of murder
and sentenced to death. 246 The Supreme Court reversed the convictions,
stating:
The State is free to regulate the procedure of its courts in accordance with
its own conceptions of policy, unless in so doing it 'offends some
principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental.'... [T]he freedom of the state in
establishing its policy is the freedom of constitutional government and is
limited by the requirement of due process of law. Because a state may
dispense with a jury trial, it does not follow that it may substitute trial by
ordeal. The rack and torture chamber may not be substituted for the
witness stand.247
Not all fact patterns are as easy to associate with torture as Brown,
which clearly displays torture at its worst. Those familiar with the "shock
the conscience" test understand that the Court has often interpreted the test
240 Id. at 2010 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
241 Id. at 2005-09.
242 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
243 Id. at 286-87.
'44 Id. at 285-86.
245 Id. at 282.
246 Id. at 279.
147Id. at 285-86 (citations omitted).
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with a great degree of flexibility, particularly when judging the actions of
law enforcement officers faced with exigent circumstances related to issues
such as public safety. In County ofSacramento v. Lewis,248 the Court denied
a § 1983 claim based on an alleged substantive due process violation. 249 In
Lewis, a motorcycle passenger died at the end of a high-speed police chase
when the motorcycle tipped over and the police car, in close pursuit, struck
and killed the respondent's sixteen-year-old son.25°
In discussing the threshold for "shocking the conscience," the Lewis
decision "made it clear that the due process guarantee does not entail a
body of constitutional law imposing liability whenever someone cloaked
with state authority causes harm.",251 Indeed, "in a due process challenge to
executive action, the threshold question is whether the behavior of the
governmental officer is so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be
said to shock the contemporary conscience. '"252
An equally important aspect of Lewis centered in the Court's view that
it must be "intended to injure in some way... by any government interest
is the sort of official action most likely to rise to the conscience-shocking
level., 253 This means that the Court will provide greater deference if the
government can demonstrate a justification for its conduct based on the
totality of the circumstances. 25 The stronger the justification, the more
flexibility allowed.255
248 County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998).
249 Id. at 854-55.
250 Id. at 836-37.
25 Id. at 848.
252 Id. at 847.
253 Id. at 849.
254 Id. at 852-53.
We accordingly [have] held that a much higher standard of fault than
deliberate indifference has to be shown for officer liability in a prison riot
Like prison officials facing a riot, the police on an occasion calling for
fast action have obligations that tend to tug against each other. Their duty
is to restore and maintain lawful order, while not exacerbating disorder
more than necessary to do their jobs. They are supposed to act decisively
and to show restraint at the same moment, and their decisions have to be
made "in haste, under pressure, and frequently without the luxury of a
second chance."
Id. (citations omitted).
25 See Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957) (holding that withdraw-
ing blood from an unconscious drunk driving suspect did not rise to the level of
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This deference factor certainly played out in the Ninth Circuit in
Blefare v. United States.256 In a fact pattern similar to Rochin, the appellants
were suspected of swallowing narcotics which were believed to be lodged
in their rectums or stomachs. 257 U.S. officials searched appellants at a
border crossing from Mexico into the United States258 after they consented
to a rectal probe by a doctor.259 When the rectal probe found no drugs, a
"[s]aline solution was ... given [to] the appellants to drink to produce
vomiting. ' 26° Blefare, one of the suspects, "was seen by the doctor to have
regurgitated an object and reswallowed it."26' Then, the doctor, without
Blefare's consent, forcefully passed a soft tube into his "nose, down [his]
throat and into [his] stomach, 262 to pass fluid which induced vomiting.
This resulted in the discovery of packets of heroin and the subsequent
conviction of Blefare.263
The Ninth Circuit refused to hold that the involuntary intrusion into
Blefare's stomach shocked the conscience.26 The court attempted to
distinguish Blefare from Rochin by noting that the officers in Rochin
illegally invaded the home and later forced an emetic into his stomach,
whereas the event in Blefare took place at a border crossing and the actions
to induce vomiting were not brutal. 265 The ruling arguably hinged on the
fact that the State had an important governmental interest in keeping heroin
from entering the United States. In the court's view it would have been
shocking had they set aside the conviction based on the due process
clause.2" The court explained:
It would shock the conscience of law abiding citizens if the officers,
with the knowledge these officers had, were frustrated in the recovery and
use of this evidence. It is shocking to know that these appellants
"shocking the conscience").
256 Blefare v. United States, 362 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1966).
257 Id. at 872.
25 Id. at 871.




263 Id. at 871.
264 Id. at 875.
265 Id.
266 Id. at 876.
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swallowed narcotics to smuggle it into and through the United States for
sale for profit ....
"If we were mechanically to invoke Massiah (Rochin) to reverse this
conviction, we would transform a meaningful expression of concern for
the rights of the individuals into meaningless mechanism for the obstruc-
tion ofjustice.'267
Proponents of coercive questioning techniques have several cases to
cite, that buttress the view that in exigent circumstances police may be
obliged to use force to obtain life-saving information. 68 In Leon v.
Wainwright, 269 for example the Eleventh Circuit brushed aside the fact that
police officers had used "force and threats ' 27° on kidnap suspect Jean Leon
in order to get him to reveal the location of his victim.27 1 When appre-
hended by a group of police officers in a Florida parking lot, Leon refused
to reveal the location of his kidnap victim (the victim, Louis Gachelin, had
been taken by gunpoint to an apartment where he was undressed and
bound).27 To get Leon to talk, police officers then "physically abused him
by twisting his arm behind his back and choking him until he revealed
where ... [the kidnap victim] was being held." '273 Leon was later taken to
the police station were he made a second confession which the court ruled
as admissible at his trial.274 The court deemed that the actions of the
officers were reasonable given the immediate concern to find the victim
and save his life.275
We do not by our decision sanction the use of force and coercion by
police officers. Yet this case does not represent the typical case of
unjustified force. We did not have an act of brutal law enforcement agents
trying to obtain a confession in total disregard of the law. This was
instead a group of concerned officers acting in a reasonable manner to
obtain information they needed in order to protect another individual from
bodily harm or death.27 6
267 Id. (quoting United States v. Guerra, 334 F.2d 138, 147 (2d Cir. 1964)).




272 Id. at 771.
273 Id.
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Returning to Chavez,27 the government briefly attempted to draw
together the concept of governmental interest by arguing that the Chavez
Court should take the opportunity to create a "terrorist exception, 27 8 which
would accord protection to police officers from § 1983 suits, when
questioning suspected terrorists. The justices did not directly address this
matter. Nevertheless, if one adds Chavez to Lewis279 and its progeny,
certain constitutional parameters for interrogating a terrorist suspect can
now be staked out. Simply put, even if a suspect asks for a lawyer and
demands that all questioning cease, law enforcement may justifiably refuse
these requests and engage in interrogation that may consist of coercive
techniques so long as the techniques utilized fall below the threshold of
shocking the conscience (which equates to actions not in violation of the
Torture Convention) Additionally, under the concept of governmental
interest, more deference is given to police interrogators the more the
suspected terrorist matches the profile of the ticking time bomb terrorist.2 0
Critics of Chavez, such as Brooklyn law professor Susan Herman,
rightly understand that allowing coercive interrogation techniques short of
the ambiguous shock the conscience standard, leaves open the door to
abuse of those not suspected of terrorism.28 Others, such as Thomas
Jefferson Law School's Marjorie Cohn, are dismayed that the Chavez Court
refused to acknowledge the existence of the Torture Convention and its
place in the matter of coercive interrogations.
Even when conducting interrogations outside the borders of the United
States, agents have no greater flexibility as to the interrogation tactics they
may lawfully employ.28 3 The applicable rules regulating the allowable
degree of persuasion are drawn from the Torture Convention which outlaws
torture and ill-treatment.284 Overseas interrogations are more likely to push
the envelope since the detainee is usually located in an environment, such
277 Chavez v. Martinez, 123 S. Ct. 1994 (2003).
278 See Brief for Petitioner at 14 n.4, Chavez (No. 0 1-1444).
279 Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 1994; County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833,
850 (1998) (holding that the phrase "shock to conscience" is not a rigid standard
and depends largely on circumstances of the case).
210 See infra Part IV.
21! David G. Savage, Terrorism War Arrives at High Court, A.B.A. J., Dec.
2002, at 28.
282 Marjorie Cohn, Dropping the Ball on Torture: The U.S. Supreme Court
Ruling in Chavez v. Martinez, JURIST, June 10, 2003, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/
forum/forumnew I 13.php.
23 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (2003).
284 See supra notes 54-78 and accompanying text.
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as Guantanamo Bay, where he has no access to any forum for judicial
review. For instance, in May 2003 reports emerged that American
interrogators were using "unorthodox musical techniques to extract
information... from their detainees [held outside the United States]. 285
Combining children's song and heavy metal rock music, interrogators were
allegedly subjecting detainees to the various sounds in order to break their
will. 286 Depending on the intensity and duration of the music, this tactic
could encompass the full range of legality-it could be a legitimate means
to disconnect a detainee from his environment if used for short periods of
time at reasonable decibels. Conversely, it could be considered a form of
torture if employed for a prolonged period of time and at an unreasonable
volume.
If one relies on the Ireland217 case as the baseline for establishing ill-
treatment, it is important to note that the Ireland Court found that the "five
techniques" used by the British government against Irish Republican Army
members caused intense physical pain and mental suffering88 but not of the
intensity and cruelty implied by torture-not severe pain.289 The Ireland
Court found that the five techniques were calculated to cause feelings of
fear and break the physical and moral remittances of the subject detainee.29 °
In turn, the United States may be able to render a suspect to a country that
engages in ill-treatment, but it may not engage in ill-treatment itself.
Another source of guidance to distinguish a reasonable interrogation
from an interrogation that crosses the line into ill-treatment or torture is the
Israeli High Court's decision in Public Committee Against Torture v. State
of Israel.9' In the context of outlawing certain interrogation practices by
Israeli officials, the High Court considered how otherwise reasonable
285 See JULIAN BORGER, Metallica is Latest Interrogation Tactic, GUARDIAN,
May 20, 2003, at P 11.
296 Id.
287 Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. (1978).
288 Id. at 79-80.
289 Id. at 80.
290 id.
291 Public Comm. Against Torture v. State of Israel, 38 I.L.M. 1471 (1999)
(consolidating the complaints of seven plaintiffs who alleged that the techniques
employed by the Israeli General Security Services were illegal). For an excellent
overview of the case, see Melissa L. Clark, Note, Israel's High Court of Justice
Ruling on the General Security Service Use of "Moderate Physical Pressure ": An
End of the Sanctioned Use of Torture?, 11 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 145,
164-67 (2000).
[VOL. 92
INTO THE STAR CHAMBER
interrogation practices could become illegal if taken to an extreme point of
intensity.292 Playing music to disorient a subject prior to questioning is not
illegal per se, but if the music is played in a manner that causes undue
suffering, it is arguably a form of ill-treatment or torture.293 Depriving
subjects of sleep during a lengthy interrogation process may be legitimate,
but depending on the extent of sleep deprivation could also constitute ill-
treatment or torture.294 The use of handcuffing for the protection of the
interrogators is a common and acceptable practice provided the handcuffs
are not tightened so as to cause excess pain.295 Similarly, the use of
blindfolds is acceptable if done for legitimate security reasons, while the
use of sacks over the head without proper ventilation is unacceptable.296
Speaking strictly from a legal perspective, the United States cannot
engage in torture without violating the Torture Convention and domestic
law.297 Still, the United States may legitimately engage in interrogation
practices that do not rise to the level of ill-treatment. This is, however, an
ambiguous zone subject to interpretation based on the facts and in many
cases unknowable without judicial guidance.298
If an agent of the United States engages in torture while interrogating,
for example, al-Qdeda suspects, the government is obligated under both
domestic and international law to investigate and prosecute those responsi-
ble. But if the United States engages in ill-treatment of al-Qdeda detainees
it is not obligated under international law to either prosecute the torturer or
to turn that person over to any other nation or entity for prosecution.299
Thus, if the much reported American "stress and duress" tactics do
constitute ill-treatment, the United States has violated international law but
is under no strict obligation under international law to take punitive action
against the offenders.300 Fortunately, the United States has exhibited a
willingness to fulfill its obligations and has conducted prosecutorial
investigations of its agents who allegedly have engaged in the ill-treatment
of detainees.'
292 See Public Comm. Against Torture, 38 I.L.M. at 1480-84.
293 'd. at 1484.
194 Id. at 1482.
295Id. at 1483.
296 id.
297 See supra Part II.
298 See supra Part II.
299 See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
300 See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
301 See infra notes 317-20 and accompanying text.
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D. Weighing the Allegations
I
Determining the credibility of charges that the United States engages
in torture or ill-treatment as a standard practice is at best difficult. While
suggestions of torture generally come from media reports based on
unnamed sources and anecdotal evidence,3 °2 the government's penchant for
secrecy regarding interrogation tactics makes an independent assessment
nearly impossible.
Many of the mainstream media reports that suggest the occurrence of
torture or ill-treatment might be occurring as a command directed practice
also send mixed signals by simultaneously cautioning that "no direct
evidence of [sanctioned] mistreatment of prisoners in U.S. custody has
come to light . ..."" To date, the mistreatment of Iraqi detainees at Abu
Ghraib prison appears to have been the result of soldiers operating in their
individual capacity.3" Then, in follow up articles to an initial story alleging
untoward conduct by American officials, one is usually greeted with a
White House spokesman who assures the public that the United States is
"in full compliance with international law dealing with torture," 305 and that
wherever detainees are being held they are all treated "'humanely, in a
manner consistent with the third Geneva Convention.' ,306
Cognizant of the dilemma of separating fact from speculation in this
type of information environment, some international law experts have
provided alternative interpretations to, for instance, the purported use of
"stress and duress" interrogation tactics. Yale law professor Ruth Wedg-
wood opined that, based on the limited information available to the public
on this matter, it was debatable whether the American interrogation
techniques as reported in the Washington Post constituted torture.30 7
Wedgewood cautioned that she was "somewhat skeptical" of the reports
from unidentified sources, wondering how much was "swagger" and "tough
302 See, e.g., supra note 99 and accompanying text; infra notes 333-34 and
accompanying text.
303 Priest & Gellman, supra note 19, at Al.
'04 Executive Summary of Article 15-6, Investigation of the 800th Military
Police Brigade by Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/
4894001.
305 Cooperman, supra note 20, at A9. "Wherever U.S. forces are holding
combatants, they are being held 'humanely, in a manner consistent with the third
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talk" as opposed to actual conduct.3 °8 Furthermore, she correctly pointed
out that reports that detainees are held in "awkward, painful positions" is
an ambiguous concept which does not speak to degree or circumstance. 30 9
Wedgwood noted: "If it's [stress and duress] hanging someone from their
wrists, absolutely not-that's prohibited .... But if it's keeping someone
in handcuffs or temporarily hooded during transport, maybe yes-as a legal
matter, there could be legitimate reasons for that., 310
Though "stress and duress" sounds foreboding, there are many
techniques involving acts which are clearly permissible under any analysis.
For example, one would be hard pressed to argue that the reported use of
female interrogators, trickery, or a day long interrogation session would
constitute a prima facia case of torture or even ill-treatment, as some have
suggested. Further, one cannot simply conclude that the use of awkward
positioning of a particular detainee violates legal norms. Without more
information, the term "awkward positioning" is simply too subjective to
evaluate.
Similarly, reports that United States Army Special Forces troops
(Green Berets) engage in illegal physical abuse of detainees as the modis
operandi of their rules of engagement are particularly suspect.31' The
Army's Special Forces are elite and highly trained professionals in every
respect, with a long history of conducting unconventional 312 and direct
action313 missions in strict accordance with the rule of law. 4 Many Special
Forces troops have been specially trained in close-quarter fighting and have
seen first-hand such combat.31 5 Although they know that the enemy violates
all codes of civilized behavior, violating basic human rights is absolutely
incompatible with their creed of professionalism. Recognizing early on that
Green Berets represent the vanguard of unconventional warfare, (then)




311 See Steve Fainaru, 9/11 Detainees Abuse: Justice Dept. Review Outlines
Immigrant Rights Violations, WASH. POST, June 3, 2003, at Al.
312 See Jeffrey Addicott, The Role of Special Operations Forces and the War
on Terrorism, in THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM: ASSESSING THE AMERICAN
RESPONSE (John Davis ed.) (forthcoming 2004).
3313 id.
3 14 Id.
311 See, e.g., Gregg Zoroya, Inches Divide Life, Death in the Afghan Darkness,




in 1995, issued a punitive directive regarding the reporting of human rights
violations committed by any Special Forces soldier." 6 These elite soldiers
are held to higher standards of conduct." 7
A factor lending tremendous credibility to the government's contention
that it abides by the international law prohibiting torture is the military's
continuing commitment to criminally investigate and prosecute those
soldiers accused of torture or ill-treatment.31 Several criminal investiga-
tions are currently underway,319 including the current criminal investigation
"into the handling of two prisoners who died in U.S. custody at the Bagram
base [in Afghanistan]. ' '320 If the government is sincere about prohibiting
torture and ill-treatment, one would certainly expect that those engaging in
such illegal acts would be investigated and punished to the full extent of the
law. The fact that military officials initiated the first story of the investiga-
tion at Bagram Air Base further boosts the sincerity of the United States to
reject the practice of illegal interrogations.32'
3 See Jeffrey F. Addicott, Special Forces and the Promotion ofHuman Rights,
SPECIAL WARFARE, Dec. 1996, at 35-36.
317 Id. The memorandum requires any Special Forces soldier who deploys
outside the United States to:
(1) Receive training in the full range of human-rights issues, both
generally and as they apply to the host nation to which the soldiers are
deploying.
(2) Report through the chain of command all gross violations of human
rights encountered [outside the continental United States].
Id.
3 See Dayside (FOX News Channel television broadcast, Oct. 31, 2003)
(discussing with Dayside's Linda Vestor the legal aspects of pending charges
against Lieutenant Colonel charged with assault in the interrogation of an Iraqi
detainee). The audience was largely opposed to the military's criminal investigation
of the officer. Id.; see also Rowan Scarborough, Colonel in Iraq Refuses to Resign;
Prosecutors Offer Rejected, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2003, at Al.
"' See Greg Risling, 8 Charged in Abuse of POWs, FORT-WORTH STAR
TELEGRAM, Oct. 19, 2003, at 21; Matt Kelley, U.S. Charges 4 MPs With Abusing
POWs, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 27, 2003, at A2; Marc Kaufman, Army
Probing Deaths of 2 Afghan Prisoners, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 2003, at A 13. Initial
autopsies suggested that one of the detainees died of a pulmonary embolism and
the other of a heart attack. Later reports listed the deaths as homicides. Id.; see also
Jonathan Turley, Allegations of Torture Hurt American Cause, NEWSDAY, Mar. 7,
2003, at A38 (discussing alleged torture).
320 See Priest & Gellman, supra note 19.
321 Id.
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Of course, the most direct source of information on torture allegations
comes from those detainees who claim to have been tortured by the
Americans.322 Consequently, as small groups of detainees are released from
custody, Western reporters have attempted to glean first hand testimony of
torture allegations.3 23 As one would expect, many of these newly-released
members of the Taliban and al-Qieda allege that they were horribly
tortured by their American captors.324 Unexpectedly, however, others in
these same groups are quite open in proclaiming that all the detainees were
well-treated and not tortured.3 25 For instance, in a group of twenty-seven
detainees released from Guantanamo Bay in July 2003, sixteen Afghans
were interviewed by Associated Press correspondents as they were
transferred to a Red Cross bus in Afghanistan. Those who alleged they
were tortured complained in general terms of "cold rooms," "crowded
rooms," and "beatings. 326 Only one in the group, Abdul Rehman,
specifically alleged that he had been "badly punished 107 times," and had
been chained and beaten with "a metal rod on his legs and back."
327
Interestingly, when pressed by reporters to show any scars or evidence left
by the torture, Rehman "refused to show scars that may have resulted from
any abuse." '328
In contrast, another detainee, Nate Gul, told reporters that none of the
detainees were beaten during interrogation: "They didn't beat us during the
interrogation.... They wrote down anything we said. They interrogated me
about 30 to 40 times. 329 One terrorist expert revealed the following
comments:
[T]wo former Pakistan inmates [in Guantanamo]-Shah Muhammad and
Sahibzada Osman Ali-told me that except for some roughing up
322 See Neil A. Lewis, Lawyer for Taliban Detainee Says His Client is
Depressed, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2003, at 25A. Few lawyers have been permitted
to see the detainees. Australian attorney Stephen Kenny represents David Hicks,
an Australian who joined the Taliban in 1999 and was captured by coalition forces
in Afghanistan. Kenny reported that his client was depressed but did not allege that
he had been tortured or abused. Id.
323 Amir Shah, Freed Afghans Tell of Jail Stay; The 16 Had Been Held at
Guantanamo Bay. They Disagreed on How They Were Treated There, PHILA.









immediately after they were captured, they were not badly treated at Camp
X-Ray. They both felt bored, lonely, frustrated, angry, and helpless
(enough for Shah Muhammad to attempt suicide), but neither believed
that he would be harmed by his American captors, and both regarded the
extreme precautions (shackles, handcuffs, hoods) that so outraged the rest
of the world as comical.33 °
In another case, a freed Afghan who spent fourteen months at
Guantanamo recalled that the Americans taught him to read and "were good
people. 33' In June 2003, Attorney General John Ashcroft addressed the
House Judiciary Committee and responded to critics who alleged" 'signifi-
cant problems' in how law enforcement officials treated some of the 762
people detained. . . .""' An internal inspector general's report. found
evidence of "alleged beatings and other abuse at a high-security facility
prison [Metropolitan Detention Center] in Brooklyn, N.Y., where 84 of the
people were detained. 333 The Attorney General testified that investigations
into the allegations were ongoing, but in no way condoned by law enforce-
ment.334
Overall, allegations that the United States condones and uses torture
and ill-treatment as interrogation tools are vastly overstated and often
simply taken for granted by scholars who should know better. For instance,
in his latest book, The Case for Israel, Professor Alan Dershowitz charges
that the United States-engages in "modified forms of torture that include
physical and psychological components." '335 He then backs up his charge by
citing newspaper articles that rely on unnamed sources.336 Certainly, there
330 See Bowden, supra note 108, at 74.
3 Carlotta Gall, Freed Afghan, 15, Recalls a Year at Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES
INT'L, Feb. 11, 2004.
332 Richard B. Schmitt, Stiffer Terror Laws Urged; Despite a Rebuke of His
Department, Ashcroft Calls for an Increase in Crimes Punishable by Life Terms
of Death and New Power to Deny Bail, L.A. TIMES, June 6, 2003, at Al. The vast
majority of these aliens were deported. Id.
333 Id.
331 Id.; see also Kevin Johnson, 9/11 Detainee Abuse Limited Officials Say,
USA TODAY, June 26, 2003, at A4 (providing that Bureau of Prisons Director
Jarley Lappin and Justice Department Inspector General Glenn Fine told a Senate
Judiciary Committee that if abuses were substantiated the bureau would take
"appropriate and decisive action").
... ALAN DERSHOWITZ, THE CASE FOR ISRAEL 135 (2004) [hereinafter
DERSHOWITZ, THE CASE FOR ISRAEL].336 Id. at 137.
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have been isolated incidents of misconduct by soldiers and law enforcement
personnel who acted outside of the scope of their sworn duty, but so far the
government has shown a good faith effort to take corrective and disciplin-
ary action when these cases are brought to light.337 Even the Army's own
popular news magazine, the Army Times, reflected this matter by devoting
the front cover of a January 2004 edition to four military police soldiers
who were punished for abusing Iraqi prisoners. 33 8Additionally, the military
is processing criminal charges against several soldiers as a result of the Abu
Ghraib prison abuse scandal. 39 The fact that some soldiers or government
agents have engaged in misconduct does not mean that the government
endorses or condones the practice.
IV. THE TICKING-TIME-BOMB SCENARIO
The old adage that it is better to free 100 guilty men than to imprison one
innocent describes a calculus that our Constitution-which is no suicide
pact 34 -- does not impose on government when the 100 who are freed
belong to terrorist cells that slaughter innocent civilians, and may well
have access to chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons .... 341
Laurence H. Tribe
Some civil libertarians342 seemingly underestimate the need for broader
security measures in combating the al-Qdeda styled terrorist threat.343
Exaggerating the dangers to civil liberties, some even engage in inflamma-
tory rhetoric by accusing the United States of "conducting assassinations
337 But see Cooperman, supra note 20, at A9 (discussing whether CIA interro-
gation techniques constitute torture).
338 See Jane McHugh, Disgraced and Out, ARMY TIMES, Jan. 19, 2004, at 1, 14
(describing the judicial punishment of four military police officers of the 320th
Military Police Battalion for abusing detainees at Camp Bucca in southern Iraq).
339 See Angie Cannon & Chitra Ragavan, A Big Legal Mess, Too, US NEWS &
WORLD REP., May 24, 2004, at 29.
340 "The Constitution is not a suicide pact" is commonly traced to Justice
Jackson in Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
14' Taylor, supra note 4, at 16 (quoting Laurence H. Tribe). Laurence H. Tribe
is the Tyler Professor of Constitutional Law at Harvard University.
342 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
343 See Associated Press, Amnesty International Says U.S., Others Have Used
9/11 to Erode Rights, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, May 29, 2002, at A6.
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• ..[and] sanctioning torture" 344 in the War on Terror."' Others, like
Harvard Professor of Law Laurence Tribe, understand that concerns over
civil liberties cannot be approached with a status quo mentality. 46 Many
legal scholars who understand the threat of al-Qfeda-styled terrorism often
cite with approval former Supreme Court Justice Jackson's observation that
"the Constitution is not a suicide pact. 347
One issue that gains a tremendous amount of attention in this debate is
how to deal with a suspected terrorist in a ticking time bomb scenario.348
Different commentators have varying turns on the theme,3 49 but it com-
monly goes something like this: Suppose a terrorist suspect is taken into
custody in a major city and is found to be in possession of nuclear bomb-
making materials and detailed maps of the downtown area. The terrorist
tells police that he is a member of al-Qdeda and that a nuclear car bomb is
on a timer set to detonate in ten hours (the time he had estimated he could
safely escape the blast). The suspect then demands a lawyer and refuses to
answer any more questions. Law enforcement may legitimately ignore his
demands and conduct a reasonable interrogation as long as they do not
engage in torture or ill-treatment, or employ techniques that would shock
3" Laura K. Donohue, The British Traded Rights for Security, Too, WASH.
POST, Apr. 6, 2003, at B1.
"Like Britain, the United States today faces the charge that it does not
respect individual rights. Its response to the terrorist attacks-shifting the
presumption of innocence, conducting assassinations, limiting due process,
engaging in inhumane behavior and sanctioning torture-does little to prove
otherwise."
Id. Laura Donohue is a fellow with the Center for International Security and
Cooperation at Stanford University.
... See, e.g., Jeffrey F. Addicott, Proposal for a New Executive Order on
Assassination, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 751 (2003) (providing that assassination, which
is murder by surprise for political purposes, is not applicable to the act of killing
al-Qieda combatants even if by surprise).
346 Taylor, supra note 4, at 16.
147 See supra notes 340-41.
348 See, e.g., Alan M. Dershowitz, Want to Torture? Get a Warrant, S.F.
CHRON., Jan. 22, 2002, at A19.
349 See, e.g., Gross, supra note 82, at 102; see also DERSHOWITZ, THE CASE FOR
ISRAEL, supra note 335; Thomas J. Lepri, Safeguarding the Enemy Within: The
Need for Procedural Protection for US. Citizens Detained as Enemy Combatants
under Ex Parte Quirin, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2565, 2594-95 (2003); Simnon
Reichman, "When We Sit to Judge We Are Being Judged" The Israeli GSS Case,
Ex Parte Pinochet and Domestic/Global Deliberation, 9 CARDOZO J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 41, 56-57 (2001).
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the conscience.35° But what if reasonable interrogation techniques yield no
information-the suspect refuses to talk? This Hobson's choice"' poses
one of the strongest arguments for the use of non-lethal torture.352
Given the premise of the ticking time bomb scenario, it is difficult to
portray oneself as a centrist-either one uses whatever means necessary to
procure the information to stop the blast or one simply allows the slaughter
of innocent civilians. Should a reasonable law enforcement officer with
spouse and children residing in the blast zone simply to resign himself to
the fact that they are all going to perish since it is unlawful under both
international and domestic law to use torture? Or is it more likely that the
law officer faced with this scenario would in fact engage in torture and
argue the defense of necessity at a subsequent criminal trial?
On the other hand, one might attempt to overcome the moral dilemma
if the government created a justification defense which sanctioned the use
of torture in special circumstances. In this manner one could eschew
hypocrisy--the government would sanction the use of torture, and the law
enforcement officer would not face prosecution for his acts.
A. Israeli View
The General Security Service of Israel ("GSS")353 is responsible for
conducting investigations of suspected terrorists who commit crimes
against the State of Israel. 3" As part of this responsibility, the GSS
engages in the detention and interrogation of suspected terrorists. Up
until the late 1980s the official position of the government of Israel
was that GSS interrogators did not use "coercive" methods during terror-
ist interrogations.355 In 1987 the government appointed the Landau
Commission356 to investigate the methods of interrogation used by the
350 See supra Part III.C.
351 Making a Hobson's choice requires a choice between two evils. See Thomas
Nagel, War and Massacre, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 123, 143 (1972).
352 See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
353 GSS is also known as the Shin Bet. See generally Jason S. Greenberg, Note,
Torture of Terrorists in Israel: The United Nations and the Supreme Court of
Israel Pave the Way for Human Rights to Trump Communitarianism, 7 ILSA J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 539, 540 (2001).
354 Id.
311 Clark, supra note 291, at 150.356 See Commission ofInquiry Into the Methods of Investigation of the General
Security Service Regarding Hostile Terrorist Activity, reprinted in 23 ISRAEL L.
REV. 146 (1989). The commission was headed by Mr. Moshe Landau, a former
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GSS.357 In November 1987 the Landau Commission issued its report,
recognizing the terrorist threat to the nation and the attendant necessity for
the GSS to engage in what it termed euphemistically as "a moderate
measure of physical pressure"'358 during interrogations of suspected
terrorists. In a separate, secret part of the report,359 the Landau Commission
set out limits to the types of physical pressure that the GSS might
employ.36 In the publicly released section of the report, the commission
advised that GSS agents should combine "non-violent psychological
pressure of a vigorous and extensive interrogation.., with.., a moderate
amount of physical pressure."36' In short, the Landau Commission provided
the green light to the GSS to use "moderate... physical pressure" 362 when
conducting interrogations.
Adopting the recommendations of the Landau Commission, the Israeli
government issued directives authorizing the GSS to use various physical
means in certain cases.363 In taking the unprecedented step of trying to
regulate the use of physical pressure during the interrogation of suspected
terrorists, the government contended that such methods did not constitute
torture.3" The Supreme Court of Israel disagreed. According to the
subsequent landmark case on the matter, Public Committee,365 the Supreme
Court of Israel found that the primary techniques used by the GSS (which
had until then remained secret) involved the following:
President of the Supreme Court of Israel.
3" The Landau Commission was prompted by two separate public scandals. The
first related to the 1984 beating death of two Palestinians by GSS officers. The
Palestinians had been taken into custody of the GSS after hijacking a civilian bus.
The second related to the espionage case of an Israeli officer who had been forced
by GSS officers to render a false confession under duress. See HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, TORTURE AND ILL-TREATMENT: ISRAEL'S INTERROGATION OF PALESTIN-
IANS FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES (1994), http://www.hrw.org/reports/1994/
israel/.
358 Id.
359 Grosso, supra note 38, at 320.
360 Gross, supra note 82, at 120-22.
361 Clark, supra note 291, at 151.
362 Id. at 152.
363 See Tom Hundley, Definition of 'Torture' Blurs: Coercion in Spain Hints
at How Many Justify the Practice, CI. TRIB., Mar. 16, 2003, at 3.




365 See Public Comm. Against Torture v. State of Israel, 38 I.L.M. 1471 (1999).
[VOL. 92
INTO THE STAR CHAMBER
(1) Shaking. The practice of shaking was deemed to be the most
brutal and harshest of all the interrogation methods. 366 The method is
defined as "forceful shaking of the [suspect's] upper torso, back and
forth, in a manner that causes the neck and head to dangle and vacillate
rapidly. 367
(2) Shabach Position. The practice of binding the subject in a child's
chair "titled forward, towards the ground. 368 This method is said to cause
"serious muscle pain in the arms, the neck and headaches."3 69 Other
reports amplify the method and add that the subject's head is "covered by
a hood while powerfully deafening music is emitted within inches of the
suspect's head. 370
(3) Frog Crouch. The practice of making the subject crouch on the
tips of his toes for five-minute intervals.
371
(4) Excessive Tightening of Handcuffs. The practice of inflicting
injury to a suspect by excessive tightening of handcuffs or through the use
of small handcuffs.372
(5) Sleep Deprivation. The practice of intentionally keeping the
subject awake for prolonged periods of time. 373
In ruling that there existed an absolute prohibition on the use of torture
as a means of interrogation,3 74 the Supreme Court held some of the
366 Clark, supra note 291, at 102 n.44. The shaking of a suspect results in
injuries similar to shaken baby syndrome in that "[tihe interrogator grabs the
interrogee, who is sitting or standing, by the labels of his shirt, and shakes him
violently, so that that the interrogator's fists beat the chest of the interrogee, and
his head is thrown backward and forward." Id. An expert who testified before the
court in Public Committee stated that "the shaking method is likely to cause serious
brain damage, harm the spinal cord, cause the suspect to lose consciousness, vomit
and urinate uncontrollably, and suffer serious headaches." Public Comm. Against
Torture, 38 I.L.M. at 1474; see also Michael L. Gross, Just and Jewish Warfare,
TIKKUN MAG., Sept.-Oct. 2001, http://www.Tikkun.org./magazine/index.cf-n/
action/Tikkun/issue/TikO 109/article/0 10913c.html.
367 See Public Comm. Against Torture, 38 I.L.M. at 1474; Gross, supra note
366.
368 Public Comm. Against Torture, 38 I.L.M. at 1475.
369 id.
370 See generally Greenberg, supra note 353, at 549.
371 Public Comm. Against Torture, 38 I.L.M. at 1475.
372 id.
171 Id. at 1476.
374 Id. at 1474.
Consequently, it is decided that the order nisi [prohibiting physical means
of interrogation] be made absolute, as we declare that the GSS does not
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practices of the GSS violated Israel's Basic Law: Human Dignity and
Liberty.375 Specifically, the court found that shaking,376 the use of the
Shabach,3" the use of the frog crouch,378 and, in certain instances, the
deprivation of sleep, 9 were all illegal and prohibited investigation
methods.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Israel was clearly apprehensive
about the sweeping scope of its decision in Public Committee, particularly
in the context of a ticking time bomb terrorist." In rendering its decision
the court strongly signaled that the Knesset (legislative branch of Israel)
might find it efficacious at some point to sanction physical means in
interrogations "provided, of course, that a law infringing upon a suspect's
liberty.., is enacted for a proper purpose, and to an extent no greater than
have the authority to "shake" a man, hold him in the "Shabach" position
[or] deprive him of sleep in a manner other than that which is inherently
required by the interrogation.
Id.
"' Id. at 1476.
376 Id. at 1474.
311 Seesupra notes 367-69 and accompanying text. Michael L. Gross des-cribes
the Shabach as seating a suspect on a "small, low chair, whose seat is tilted
forward, towards the ground. One hand is tied behind the suspects back, and placed
between the chair's seat and back support, the second hand is tied behind the chair,
against the back support." Hoods soaked in urine and "powerfully loud music"
were also commonly used simultaneously with the Shabach. Gross, supra note 366.
378 Public Comm. Against Torture, 38 I.L.M. at 1475. The court ruled that the
frog crouch "is degrading and infringes upon an individual's human dignity." Id.
371 Id. at 1484-85. The court recognized that interrogation for a prolonged
period of time is necessarily exhausting and an inevitable part of a normal
interrogation process. Nevertheless, the court understood that sleep deprivation
could be the basis for complaint. Id.
[Questioning the suspect for a prolonged period of time] is part of the
"discomfort" inherent to an interrogation. This being the case, depriving the
suspect of sleep is, in our opinion, included in the general authority of the
investigator.... The above described situation is different from those in
which sleep deprivation shifts from being a "side effect" inherent to the
interrogation, to an end in itself. If the suspect is intentionally deprived of
sleep for a prolonged period of time, for the purpose of tiring him out or
"breaking" him-it shall not fall within the scope of a fair and reasonable
investigation.
Id. at 1484.
380 Id. at 1488 ("Our apprehension that this decision will hamper the ability to
properly deal with terrorists and terrorism, disturbs us.").
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is required. '38' To date, the Israeli legislature has not enacted any such
legislation.
The Supreme Court of Israel went on to recognize the defense of
necessity if individual GSS investigators employed such prohibited
interrogation techniques in the case of a ticking time bomb scenario. 38 2
Citing Israeli penal law regarding necessity 383-- engaging in illegal conduct
in order to promote a greater good-the Court recognized that GSS
interrogators would have the right to raise the defense of necessity in a
subsequent prosecution.384 The Court stated that "[o]ur decision does not
negate the possibility that the 'necessity' defense be available to GSS
investigators [in ticking-time-bomb scenarios] ... if criminal charges are
brought against them, as per the Court's discretion ., 385 The Court said "that
if a GSS investigator-who applied physical interrogation methods for the
purpose of saving human life-is criminally indicted, the 'necessity'
[defense] is likely open to him in the appropriate circumstances. '"386
Indeed, the Court seemed to anticipate that any reasonable GSS
investigator, charged with protecting innocent lives, would apply "physical
interrogation methods for the purpose of saving human life, 387 when
confronted with a ticking-time-bomb terrorist. In other words, GSS
investigators would use whatever means necessary to avert the explosion
" Id. at 1476-77. The court accepted that
"[I]n the appropriate circumstances, GSS investigators may avail them-
selves of the "necessity" defense, if criminally indicted .... [But here w]e
are not dealing with the potential criminal liability of a GSS investigator
.... The question before us is whether it is possible to infer the authority
to, in advance, establish permanent directives setting out the physical
interrogation means that may be used under conditions of "necessity."
Id. at 1486.
382 Id. at 1476-77.
383 Penal Law, Article 34(11) (1977). This Article states:
A person will not bear criminal liability for committing any act immediately
necessary for the purpose of saving the life, liberty, body or property, of
either himself or his fellow person, from substantial danger of serious harm,
imminent from the particular circumstances, at the requisite [time], and
absent alternative means for avoiding the harm.
Id.
384 Public Comm. Against Torture, 38 I.L.M. at 1477.
385 Id. at 1489.
386 Id. at 1486. The court went on to add that the ticking time bomb issue was
"not the issue before the Court" and did not apply to the current issues at hand. Id.
at 1490.
387 Id. at 1486.
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of the bomb. The Court noted, however, that the threat of the explosion
must be a "concrete level of imminent danger":388
[The] "necessity" exception is likely to arise in instances of "ticking time
bombs," and that the immediate need.., refers to the imminent nature of
the act rather than the danger. Hence, the imminence criteria is satisfied
even if the bomb is set to explode in a few days, or perhaps even after a
few weeks, provided that the danger is certain to materialize and there is
no alternative means of preventing its materialization. In other words,
there exists a concrete level of imminent danger of the explosion's
occurrence.
389
B. The Defense of Necessity
The defense of necessity is a doctrine well know to the common law.
Black's Law Dictionary defines it as "[a] justification defense for a person
who acts in an emergency that he or she did not create and who commits a
harm that is less severe than the harm that would have occurred but for the
person's actions. '390 A leading criminal law text amplifies this definition
by explaining that "the harm done is justified by the fact that the action
taken either accomplished a greater good or prevented a greater harm. 39'
The general understanding of the common law necessity defense was
that it responded to circumstances emanating from the forces of nature and
not from people.392 When the pressure is from human beings, the defense,
if applicable, is duress not necessity.
Today, the distinction between the pressure coming from nature or
human beings has merged.393 The necessity defense extends to both
instances.
[The reason for the defense is one of] public policy: the law ought to
promote the achievement of higher values at the expense of lesser values,
and sometimes the greater good for society will be accomplished by




9 Id. at 1485-86.
390 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at 1053.
311 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 449 (4th ed. 2003).392 Id. ("The necessity defense has sometimes been viewed as analogous to the
defense of coercion, the essential difference between the two being that the former
has to do with the pressure of natural physical forces, fire, while the latter has to
do with a threat from a human agent.").
391 Id. at 523.
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The matter is often expressed in terms of choice of evils: when the
pressure of circumstances presents one with a choice of evil, the law
prefers that he avoid the greater evil by bringing about the lesser evil.394
Still, the necessity defense is unavailable to a defendant in situations
where the legislature has previously made a determination of values. 395 The
Model Penal Code clearly states this concept: "[n]either the Code nor other
law defining the offense provides exceptions or defenses dealing with the
specific situation involved; and a legislative purpose to exclude the
justification claimed does not otherwise plainly appear. 396 For instance, a
person may not take a human life in order to save himself. 97
C. Professor Dershowitz's View
Harvard Law School's Alan Dershowitz has publicly advocated a far
more aggressive approach to dealing with such things as the ticking-time-
bomb terrorist. 398 Dershowitz opposes the use of a necessity defense
because relying on a necessity defense allows for torture to be carried on
"beneath the radar screen, 399 which invites greater abuse by law enforce-
ment agents. Without bantering words, Dershowitz advocates using
nonlethal torture to obtain life saving information from a ticking time bomb
terrorist.4"0 Dershowitz's views have certainly spawned a firestorm of
debate4  - -n ot because he has advocated something new, but because it was
394 Id. at 524.
"I Id. at 525.
396 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (1985).
397 See, e.g., The Queen v. Dudley 14 Q.B.D. 273, 274 (1884). Four seamen
were cast away in a storm, one of them a seventeen-year old boy. Facing starvation,
two of the defendants murdered the boy and all of the remaining three ate his flesh.
The court rejected the necessity defense, ruling that it was their duty "to declare
that the prisoners' act in this case was wilful murder, that the facts as stated in the
verdict are no legal justification of the homicide." Id. at 287-88.
See DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS, supra note 24. For an excellent
discussion, see Chanterelle Sung, Note, Torturing the Ticking Time Bomb
Terrorist: An Analysis of Judicially Sanctioned Torture in the Context of
Terrorism, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 193 (2003).
'99 DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS, supra note 24, at 163.
400 Id. at 161. Dershowitz disagrees with those who "see silence as a virtue
when it comes to the choice among such horrible evils as torture and terrorism." Id.
401 See William F. Schulz, The Torturer's Apprentice, NATION, May 13, 2002,
at 25, http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20020513&s=schultz (reviewing




Alan Dershowitz, the well-known civil libertarian,4" 2 who had made the
case for State-sponsored torture.
According to Dershowitz, such instruments of non-lethal torture could
include the use of "say, a sterilized needle inserted under the fingernails to
produce unbearable pain without any threat to health or life. '403 The
authority to engage in the non-lethal torture would come from a torture
warrant issued by a judge.40 4 In this manner, Dershowitz argues that the
process of torture is judicially sanctioned and the chances of abuse by
individual investigators is thereby reduced:4"5 "I believe ... that a formal
requirement of a judicial warrant as a prerequisite to nonlethal torture
would decrease the amount of physical violence directed against
suspects. 406
Those who oppose torture under any circumstance, including the
ticking time bomb scenario, invariably attempt to change or avoid the
premise. Those who flatly reject Dershowitz's proposal for judicial torture
warrants for a ticking time bomb terrorist are prone to engage in
avoidance. 407 For example, a recent law review article noted that "[b]y
expanding the narrow framework of Dershowitz's inquiry, it is possible to
focus our debate on alternative means of maintaining national security that
do not violate [the] human dignity" of the terrorist.4 8 The only way to
lessen the likelihood of a ticking-time-bomb scenario, of course, is to
neutralize the bomb before the fuse is lit, that is, increasing police powers
to break up the terrorist organizations and to prevent the unthinkable from
coming to fruition.
The rule of law and democracy are cherished values that must be
protected. Dershowitz, however, counters that in time of war it is some-
402 DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS, supra note 24, at 141 (describing
himself as a civil libertarian).
403 Id. at 144. "When I respond by describing the sterilized needle being shoved
under the fingernails, the reaction is visceral and often visible-a shudder coupled
with a facial gesture of disgust." Id. at 148.
404 Id. at 141. "Moreover, if you believe that nonlethal torture is justifiable in
the ticking bomb case, why not require advance judicial approval--a 'torture
warrant'?" Id.4
15 Id. at 158.
406 id.
407 Id. at 134-37 (anticipating this technique as a means to avoid making a
difficult choice).
40 See Sung, supra note 398, at 196.
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times necessary to, as Abraham Lincoln recognized, suspend our liberties
to protect our liberties. 4
°9
Interestingly, Dershowitz's argument would require lawyers to chart a
legal course around the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment
protections of the United States Constitution while simultaneously ignoring
the binding obligations of the Torture Convention, that torture, under "[no]
exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of
war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be
invoked as a justification for torture."4 '
Dershowitz also fails to consider the matter of war crimes in his
argument. To add judicial torture warrants to the corpus of America's rule
of law would not only make a mockery of the rule of law, it would subject
the United States to allegations of international war crimes. All of the
existing international laws relating to armed conflict-including the
Geneva Conventions, 41 1 the Hague Conventions, 412 and customary
principles-are codified by the military in Field Manual 27-10, Depart-
ment of the Army Field Manual of the Law of Land Warfare ("FM 27-
l0",).413 Violations of the law of war are labeled as war crimes.4" 4 FM 27-10
defines the term war crime as a "technical expression for a violation of the
law of war by a person or persons, military or civilian."4 5 War crimes are
409 REHNQUIST, supra note 1, at 48. Lincoln's most notorious violation of the
Constitution is associated with his unilateral suspension of habeas corpus, which
resulted in thousands of Northerners being arrested without charge or trial and
imprisoned indefinitely. "On October 14, 1861, Lincoln wrote General Scott [the
commander of all Union forces at that time] authorizing him to suspend the writ of
habeas corpus 'anywhere between Bangor, Maine, and Washington.' "Id.
410 Torture Convention, supra note 43, at art. 2.
'4 The 1949 Geneva Conventions cover four categories: (1) Geneva Conven-
tion of Aug. 12, 1949, for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S.
31; (2) Geneva Convention of Aug. 12, 1949 for the Amelioration of the Condition
of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 6
U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; (3) Geneva Convention of Aug.
12, 1949, Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S.
No. 3364,75 U.N.T.S. 135; and (4) Geneva Convention of Aug. 12, 1949, Relative
to the Protections of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No.
3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
412 Hague No. IV of 1907.





divided into simple breaches and grave breaches. The Geneva Conventions
set out grave breaches to include such acts as torture or inhuman treatment,
including biological experiments, or willfully causing great suffering or
serious injury to body or health.4 6 FM 27-10, paragraph 502 defines the
following acts as "grave breaches," of the Geneva Convention of 1949 if
committed against persons or property protected by the Conventions:
willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experi-
ments, willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health,
and extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by
military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.417
Each nation is under a strict legal obligation to search for all persons
alleged to have committed war crimes and to investigate all allegations of
war crimes." 8 If a grave breach of the law of war is discovered, then that
nation must prosecute1 9 or extradite the accused offender.420
If one accepts the premise that the United States is at war with the al-
Qdeda network, then it certainly follows that the law of war is violated
should an American investigator, civilian or military, engage in torture.
Acts of torture constitute a grave breach of the law of war and the United
States has an obligation to investigate and, if allegations of torture are
valid, to either prosecute or extradite the offender to a nation that desires
to prosecute. There are no exceptions for a ticking time bomb. The al-
Qdeda are clearly illegal combatants, but that does not give the United
States license to torture them.
D. A Right Thing Must Be Done in a Right Way
It is easy to choose between a right and a wrong, but the ticking time
bomb scenario forces one to choose between the lesser of two wrongs.
Disregarding the legal issues associated with torturing a ticking time bomb
terrorist, is it possible to morally justify the use of torture to extract
information? Those who believe so point to the so-called utilitarian




4191 It is the policy of the United States that all military persons accused of grave
breaches of the law of war are charged with the substantive crime under the
Uniformed Code of Military Justice and prosecuted in a military courts martial.420 Dep't of Army, Reg. 350-216, Training-The Geneva Conventions of 1949
and Hague No. IV of 1907, 5a (Mar. 7, 1975).
421 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 12 (J.H. Bums & H.L.A. Hart eds.,
1996).
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concept of utilitarianism, the pain inflicted on the ticking time bomb
terrorist by means of otherwise prohibited interrogation techniques is
weighed against the potential pain and death that would be inflicted on the
community. Those who believe that the community's welfare is of greater
value than the welfare of the terrorist who seeks to destroy the community
cite the utilitarian argument with approval.22
Many words in the English language describe a person who not only
does the right thing in a given situation, but performs that action in the
right way.423 Such a person may be described as exhibiting virtue, integrity,
honor, and courage, just to name a few character traits. The formula of
doing a right thing in a right way is an essential ingredient for the
establishment and development of a just and democratic society based on
the rule of law. Conversely, deviations from the formula are destructive to
the individual and society. For instance, I regularly inform my students that
getting an A on a Civil Procedure exam in law school is a right thing, but
cheating to accomplish this goal can only be characterized as a wrong way
to achieve the A. Thus, doing a right thing (getting an A) must be done in
a right way (by studying and not cheating) or the result is wrong.
In dealing with the ticking time bomb terrorist scenario, the right thing
is simple enough to appreciate-law enforcement must get the information
that could save the lives of thousands or, if the bomb is a weapon of mass
destruction, tens of thousands. The more difficult part of the formula is the
second half--getting the needed information in the right way.
Prior to Public Committee, the Israeli government took the step of
trying to regulate the use of torture, if not by means of a judicial torture
warrant, then by administrative rules.424 In short, the government directives
had provided a justification defense to an interrogator who engaged in
torture. This practice was struck down as unlawful. 425 A similar move to
regulate torture in the United States would certainly meet the same end-a
democracy cannot sanction torture. Once it does, it has abandoned the
moral high ground; it is no longer a democracy. Whether justification flows
from the legislative, executive or judicial branch, it is anathema to a
freedom-loving people.
Drawn from the Israeli approach in Public Committee, a necessity
defense would require him to satisfy a four pronged test: (1) the investiga-
422 Id.
423 This excludes adherents to the post modernist approach which denies the
existence of intrinsic or absolute values.
424 See CLARK, supra note 291, at 151.
425 See Public Comm. Against Torture, 38 I.L.M. at 1475.
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tor had reasonable grounds to believe that the suspect had direct knowledge
which could be used to prevent the weapon from detonating; (2) that the
weapon posed an imminent danger to human life; (3) that there existed no
alternative means of preventing the weapon from exploding; and (4) that
the investigator was acting to save human life.426
V. CONCLUSION
"If interrogators step over the line from coercion to outright torture, they
should be held personally responsible. But no interrogator is ever going
to be prosecuted for keeping Khalid Sheikh Mohammed awake, cold.
alone, and uncomfortable. Nor should he be. -427
Mark Bowden
The balance between civil liberties and security demands has unques-
tionably changed. To be sure, the debate on where the balance should rest
must be deliberate and inclusive of all voices, but the hard premise that
accentuates the call for robust debate must rubricate the discussion--these
al-Qdeda-styled fanatics are in our midst and mean to slaughter us
wholesale if they can.428 Many know this fact well, yet they are naive in
considering the real world ramifications of advocating that no revisions
need be made to existing authorities, laws, and processes. The pre-9/1 1
environment will certainly never return and evil forces of terror remain
fixed on the horizon.429 Unfortunately, in the technological age of weapons
of mass destruction, we need only be unlucky once for catastrophe to
cripple the nation and the civilized world. As General Tommy Franks
warned, such an event would "cause our population to question our own
Constitution and to begin to militarize our country in order to avoid"
another weapon of mass destruction event.43
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist's quote at the beginning of this
Article speaks to the challenge of achieving or maintaining a proper
426 See id. at 1482-89.
427 See Bowden, supra note 108, at 76.
428 See, e.g., Kaplan et al., supra note 194.
429 Dave Moniz & Tom Squitieri, Defense Memo: A Grim Outlook, USA
TODAY, Oct. 22, 2003, at A l (citing a two-page Secretary of Defense memorandum
dated October 16, 2003 that spell out the difficulties fighting the war on terror).
430 Marvin R. Shanken, General Tommy Franks, CIGAR AFICIONADO, Nov./Dec.
2003, at 74.
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balance between freedom and order in time of national crisis.43'
Rehnquist's words bear repeating: "In wartime, reason and history both
suggest that this balance shifts to some degree in favor of order-in favor
of the government's ability to deal with conditions that threaten the
national well-being. 432 While his observation is undoubtedly correct in
terms of past wars in our history, the uniqueness of the War on Terror
poses a far more difficult dilemma for those concerned with civil liberties.
The War on Terror may never "be over," so the on-going conflict presents
a fundamentally new and potentially devastating threat to civil liberties. If
the War on Terror has no end in sight, Rehnquist's premise that order must
trump freedom in wartime could mean that freedoms quickly relinquished
in this war may never return. Accordingly, calls for greater "order" must be
carefully weighed, debated, and incrementally enacted.
More importantly, America's strongest weapon in the War on Terror
does not rest with our military might or police functions. In the long run,
America's strongest weapon is our uncompromising commitment to the
freedoms and civil liberties embodied in our Constitution and reflected in
the U.N. Charter. If we engage in tactics that violate the democratic
principles that make up our rule of law are we different from the terrorists
at our gates? The United States of America can only ride the crests of the
waves of history so long as it follows a rule of law rooted in human rights
and democratic principles. America will drown in the sea of hypocrisy if it
trades civil liberties for a mess of pottage. Terrorism consultant Brian
Jenkins agrees that the best defense against the terrorists calls for a
''continuing commitment to the basic values that ... the nation stands
for"
4 33
The purpose of detainee interrogation is to glean as much intelligence
as possible from individuals who have information associated with the al-
Qdeda terrorist network and all associated terror networks. The goal is to
apprehend as many of the terrorists as possible and to prevent future acts
of terror on our people with particular concern for the likelihood that our
enemies will surely use weapons of mass destruction against us. The
civilized world faces a relentless campaign by these apocalyptic terrorists
who seek our destruction. To date, interrogations have yielded much
valuable information. According to the Jacoby Declaration, as of January
431 REHNQUIST, supra note 1.
432 Id.




2003, the United States thwarted over 100 terrorist attacks worldwide based
on information provided in part from detainee interrogations.434
One matter is fundamentally certain: if al-Qdeda is to be kept at bay,
the United States must rely on detainee interrogation as an integral anti-
terrorist tool.4 35 The need for the interrogator to get information to protect
the lives of innocent people is a legitimate and perfectly lawful exercise. By
its very nature, even the most reasonable interrogation places the detainee
in emotional duress and causes stress in his being-both physical and
mental. Still, a reasonable interrogation must necessarily be free of torture
or ill-treatment. As new techniques are explored, the United States must
develop methods that penetrate quickly the consciousness of the detainee
without causing pain and suffering.
Those who regularly claim that the United States oversteps the line
regarding torture and ill-treatment tend to invoke the worn slippery slope
argument, but that does not mean that the potential for abuse does not exist.
The old saw attributed to Lord Acton that power tends to corrupt is valid.436
In conclusion, judicious modifications to our civil liberties must be
made in time of war. The War on Terror provides Americans an opportu-
nity to reexamine much of what this nation represents to the world. The
sanctioned use of torture must surely strike the vast majority as inconsistent
with civilized values. Accordingly, while there could very well exist an
emergency ticking-time-bomb scenario in which torture of a particular
terrorist is necessary, the interrogator must face criminal liability. To
approach the issue in any other manner would send the wrong signal to
friends and foes alike. Those who believe that the United States can defend
freedom by subverting our own values are as misguided as those who
demand that the government fight the War on Terror without altering civil
liberties by jot or tittle. Torture is illegal and must remain on the books as
such.
134 Jacoby Declaration supra note 167.
131 See, e.g., Jack Solomon, Interrogation Reveals How 9/11 Developed, USA
TODAY, Sept. 22, 2003, at A3.
436 See ROLAND HILL & OWEN CHADWICK, LORD ACTON (May 2002). "Power
tends to corrupt; absolute power corrupts absolutely." Historian Lord Acton's epic
warning was that political power is the most serious threat to liberty. Lord Acton
(1834-1902) was born in Naples and educated in England, Scotland, France, and
Germany, where he developed an extraordinary knowledge of European political
history.
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